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published in: Hiroshima Peace Science (IPSHU), April 2001, pp. 63—118. 
 
1. Introduction: Missile Proliferation and Missile Defense at the Dawn of the 21st   
      Century 
 
”Nuclear trends in Asia are moving in the opposite direction. Asia contains the only 
nuclear weapon-state that is increasing its arsenal of nuclear and ballistic missiles 
(China); the two states which have recently chosen to declare their nuclear capabilities 
(india and Pakistan); the third (and now unique) ‘threshold countries’ (Israel); and the two 
countries found guilty of violating their non-proliferation commitments (Iraq and North 
Korea). In addition, South Korea and Taiwan ran military nuclear programmes in the 
1960s and 1970s; Iran has long been suspected of activities prohibited under the NPT; 
and Japan is recognised as having a latent capability to produce nuclear weapons quickly. 
Lastly, the US and Russia are major Asian powers as well. Asia therefore comprises more 
nuclear powers or nuclear-capable states than any other region in the world.” 
(So the French expert Therèse Delpech, Director of Policy Planning at the Atomic Energy 
Commission, Paris, in an analysis of December 19981) 
                                            
• This analysis is based on a number of previous publications of the author as the result of a research 
project sponsored by the Volkswagen Foundation. See F.Umbach, ‘World Gets Wise to P’yongyang’s 
Nuclear Blackmail – Part One”, Jane’s Intelligence Review (JIR), September, pp. 33-36; Part Two, 
ibid, October, pp. 35-39; idem, ‘Nuclear Proliferation Challenges in East Asia and Prospects for Co-
ooperation – A View from Europe’, in: Kurt W. Radtke/Raymond Feddema (Eds.), ‘Comprehensive 
Security in Asia. Views from Asia and the West on a Changing Security Environment and Their 
Implications for Europe’ (Brill Publishers: Leiden-Boston-Cologne 2000), pp. 66-133, and idem, 
‘Proliferation Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region and the Implications for the U.S.-Japanese 
Security Alliance‘, in: JIIA (Ed.), ‘Security of Asia-Pacific. Mid-Term Report‘, Tokyo, March 1999, pp. 
92-107 as well as some publications in German. 
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The year of 1998 seems in many respects a turning point or even a ”irreversible 
milestone” in the nuclear age and of global nonproliferation efforts to curb the spread of 
mass destruction weapons (MDW) and related technologies and materials. It was 
certainly a year with new emerging perilous trends which have threatened the hitherto 
rather successful regional and global non-proliferation policies during the last years. In 
May 1998, India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests which might trigger a full-fledged 
nuclear and missile race in the region and further undermine stability in South Asia. In 
July, Iran tested its 1,300km maximum range Shahab-3 ballistic missile which is a 
version of North Korea’s No-dong-I (also called Rodong-I) missile. It will give Iran the 
capability to target U.S. and European allies in the Middle East as well as their armed 
forces deployed in the region. In August 1998, North Korea tested its Taepo-Dong-I 
missile over Japan, which — together with the revelation that North Korea is 
constructing a suspicious underground site —, has threatened the October 1994 Agreed 
Framework and therewith the KEDO-process, aimed to discourage nuclear proliferation 
on the Korean Peninsula.  
In this context, it is important to note that the major source of proliferation threats in 
East Asia (and particularly Northeast Asia) is not transfers from outside into the region, 
but instead domestic production lines in China as well as North Korea and accordingly, 
missile and related technology transfers out of this region to the Gulf-, the Middle East 
and other regions of the world.  
In regard to the threats of mass destruction weapons (MDW), Japan’s security policy as 
a non-nuclear weapon state (NWS), is mainly affected by nuclear ambitions of four de 
facto or potential nuclear powers in the Asia-Pacific Rim and South Asia:  
(1) by North Korea as a ”rogue state”’ and its reluctance to submit itself unambiguously 
to the requirements of the NPT-regime;  
(2) by China as the major potential military rival of Japan in the 21st century with its own 
ambitious modernization programs for its strategic nuclear forces and with its 
ambivalent proliferation policy of nuclear-related technology and end products (such 
as missiles) to other nuclear threshold states as well as  
                                                                                                                                            
1  Therèse Delpech, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the ‘New World Order’: Early Warning from Asia?’, 
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(3) by the Indo-Pakistani nuclear arms race and weaponry programs and  
(4) impacts of the nuclear legacy of the former Soviet Union (brain drain of nuclear and 
ballistic missile scientists as well as illegal smuggeling of fissile material to potential 
nuclear threshold countries).  
Furthermore, two neighboring countries of Japan — South Korea and Taiwan — 
seemed from the late 1960s to the beginning of the 1990s on the brink to become a 
NWS. But they stopped their clandestine nuclear weapons programs due to massive 
political pressure of the U.S. and after having received some kind of security guarantees 
as well as agreed military support when they are confronted with military aggression.2  
The dangerous trends in South Asia and on the Korean peninsula in 1998 have also 
revealed the wide gap between Western and Asian nuclear perspectives. In contrast to 
the U.S., Russia, Great Britain and France which already have reduced and still 
continuing to downsize their nuclear arsenals, nuclear trends in Asia move obviously in 
another direction. Indeed, the most complex nuclear challenges ”are located in Asia and 
nowhere else” as Therèse Delpech has argued.3 
Understandably, the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 were, inter alia, a 
particular shock for Japan which has always actively pursued and supported regional as 
well as global non-proliferation efforts to contain the spread of nuclear, chemical, 
biological weapons and ballistic missile systems as their delivery systems. Although 
South Asia has a quarter of the world’s population and has important implications for 
Japan’s future energy security (sea-lanes of communication to the Middle East and the 
Gulf and its access to energy sources in Central Asia), Tokyo has had rather limited ties 
with this region until very recently, and those have been almost exclusively economic. In 
the meantime, however, Japan has established a strategic security relationship with 
India that is clearly directed to counterbalance a perceived growing Chinese weight in 
                                                                                                                                            
Survival, Winter 1998-99, pp. 57-76. 
2  To Taiwan’s nuclear ambitions see Gerald Segal, Wall Street Journal, 4 August 1998, p. 8; Tim 
Weiner, International Herald Tribune (IHT), 22 December 1997, p. 4; David Albright/Corey Gay, 
‘Nuclear Nightmare Averted’, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 1998, pp. 54-
60, Andrew Mack, ‘Potential, Not Proliferation’, ibid, July/August 1997, pp. 48-53, and William Burr, 
‘New Archival Evidence on Taiwanese ‘Nuclear Intentions’, 1966-1976’, National Security Archive 
Electronic Briefing Book (via Internet: www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB20/). To South 
Korea’s nuclear ambitions and abandoned programs see A.Mack ibid and in particular Michael J. 
Siler, ‘U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy in the Northeast Asian Region During the Cold War: The 
South Korean Case’, East Asian Studies, Autumn-Winter 1998, pp.41-86. 
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the region, thereby pushing aside any of its traditional security concerns in regard to 
India’s nuclear weapon’s program and the Southasian nuclear arms race between 
Pakistan and India.4 
The nuclear tests of India and Pakistan have so far only displayed a nuclear weapon-
capability and not a credible nuclear deterrence posture (both states seem still years 
away to acquiring it). But they might change the strategic evolution of the entire region 
and significantly influence the relationship between India and Pakistan. It is 
demonstrated by the fact that at the time of the US cruise missile strikes against Osama 
bin Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan in August 1998, Washington sent General 
Joseph Ralston, the Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Islamabad in order 
to make clear that the US cruise missiles were not Indian, and were not striking 
Pakistan.5 Furthermore, the tests might in particular deteriorate the already ambivalent 
relationship between India and China which may acquire global dimensions: A future 
unstable Sino-Indian geopolitical rivalry, maybe even more than the ambiguous China-
Japan relationship, thus may become one of the greatest security challenges in the 21st 
century of an increased multipolarity.  
Moreover, the nuclear tests have threatened global efforts to contain nuclear weaponry. 
The political fallout, such as the US credibility and prestige, might thus have, for 
instance, a profound impact in the Middle East.6 It might encourage Arab states, and 
Iran, to break Israel’s regional nuclear monopoly. Israel has already become alarmed 
few months before the Indian and Pakistani tests about Iran’s ballistic missile projects, 
such as the Shahab-3 missile, developed with the assistance of Russia and China. 
Hereby, Iran’s nuclear ambitions and missile capabilities might play a much more 
important role than Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities (”Islamic bomb”) as a deterrence to 
Israel’s nuclear arsenal. Furthermore, it is widely believed that Saudi Arabia and — 
perhaps Libya — have funded Pakistan’s nuclear programs and that a number of 
Pakistani technicians are working in Iran’s main missile program. Pakistan’s newly 
acquired skills and test data might thus find also a way to Iran. The US and Western 
                                                                                                                                            
3  Therèse Delpech, ‘Nuclear Weapons and the ‘New World Order’, here p.58. 
4  To Japan’s traditional security concerns vis-à-vis Southasia and its promotion of dynamic non-
proliferation and disarmament policies see Satu P. Limaye, ‘Tokyo’s Dynamic Diplomacy: Japan and 
the Subcontinent’s Nuclear Tests’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, August 2000, pp. 322-339. 
5  See Flora Lewis, IHT, 28 August 1998, p. 9. 
6  See also Juan Romero, ‘Charting Reactions to the Islamic Bomb’, JIR, March 1999, pp. 32-37. 
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sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan might intensify the Arab frustrations on the 
policy of ”double standards” by the West which allowed Israel to develop an arsenal of 
an estimated 200 nuclear warheads and which excludes it from international 
inspections. If a new arms race, including ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, in the 
Middle East will take place, then Israel might felt to be forced to follow India’s example 
and to openly demonstrate its nuclear capabilities to deter potential Arabian enemies. 
Continual development and procurement of ballistic missiles might thus threaten to 
erode the nuclear non-weaponized deterrent elsewhere. The Middle East, however, is 
not the only region where the nuclear explosion and ballistic missile tests might have 
grave consequences for stability.  
The article will consider the global proliferation network between China, Pakistan and 
North Korea during the 1990s, Russia’s ambiguous denuclearization and nuclearization 
tendencies of its security policies, China’s nuclear modernization efforts and its 
ambivalent non-proliferation policies as well as the situation of the Korean peninsula 
and the prospects for curbing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions and ballistic missile 
exports. Against this background, I will outline some of the implications for Japan’s 
security policies and the TMD debates in East Asia. 
 
2. The Global Proliferation Network between China, Pakistan and North Korea 
China’s military assistance in promoting and fastening Pakistan’s missile programs has 
long been known as a major source of nuclear and missile know-how and technologies 
to Pakistan and was a matter of ongoing friction in the bilateral relationship between 
Washington and Beijing since the beginning of the 1990s. China is believed not only to 
assist Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs directly but also indirectly through 
missile technology transfers via North Korea to Pakistan. According to U.S. experts, 
China changed its tactics after its M-9 and M-11 missile deliveries to Pakistan which 
provoked strong U.S. criticism and hampered a rapprochement with Washington. 
Instead of its missile exports, China began rather to support financially Pakistan’s 
expansion of a ballistic missile infrastructure and to provide the soft technology as well 
as engineering for the Ghauri-missile project. Together with the problem of dual-use 
technologies, those new forms of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
and delivery systems are much more difficult to trace. In this context, North Korea 
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served as a conduit for part of Beijing’s assistance. Pyongyang had to provide hardware 
and components from its Nodong and Taep’o-dong missiles which limited China’s direct 
military assistance to Pakistan’s missile projects to those areas in which North Korea 
was still coping with technical problems, such as guidance.7 
 
The Secret China-Pakistani Nuclear Co-operation 
1974 China assigns 12 scientists to help Pakistan develop a nuclear device. 
1975 China helps Pakistan build nuclear-weapons research centres. 
1977 China and Pakistan plan to build and test Pakistan’s first nuclear bomb, but the 
fall of Pakistan’s government suspends the operation. 
1983  China gives Pakistan complete design for a nuclear weapon and enough 
uranium for two bombs, according to U.S. intelligence. 
1986 China reportedly gives Pakistan enough tritium gas for 10 nuclear weapons, as 
well as enriched uranium. 
1989 China allows Pakistani scientists to observe a nuclear test. 
1994-1996 China helps to build 300 megawatt nuclear power plant at Chasma and tritium 
gas purification plant at Khushab. 
1995 A Chinese company sells 5,000 ring magnets used to make weapons-grade 
uranium to a nuclear research laboratory at Kahuta. 
1996 To avoid U.S. sanctions, China pledges not to provide assistance to 
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in Pakistan. It also signs the CTBT. 
1998 Pakistan tests its first nuclear bomb. 
Source: Nayan Chanda et.al., ‘The Race is On’, FEER, 11 June 1998, pp.20-22, here p.22. 
 
Although the nuclear test of Pakistan was certainly not in the Chinese interest and 
Beijing had obviously tried to persuade Islamabad not to answer India’s nuclear test 
with an own one, it reserved its condemnation only for India. Given China’s close 
involvement in Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs (such as deliveries of 600km-
range M-9/DF-15 and 280km-range M-11/DF-11 missiles) — a highly secret and 
extremely close relationship between both armed forces for four decades and an 
evolving Sino-Indian nuclear rivalry in the 21st century —, Beijing has no strategic 
interest in ending its close strategic relationship with Pakistan — albeit it has quietly 
stopped supporting Islamabad on the Kashmir conflict and urged Pakistan to solve the 
                                            
7  See Josep Bermudez, ‘A Silent Partner’, in: Jans’s Defence Weekly (JDW), 20 May 1998, pp. 16-17, 
here p. 17. 
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dispute with India by normalizing its relationship with New Delhi in the last years. In 
general, however, it seems rather unlikely that China will cut its close relationship with 
Pakistan.8 Indeed, it insists to maintain a similar geostrategic relationship with Pakistan 
like the U.S. relationship with Israel. Moreover, Chinese experts suspect that the United 
States had not been surprised by India’s nuclear tests but is secretly pleased with an 
Indian nuclear counterbalance to China.9 Against this background of a new strategic 
gamble in South Asia, it is expected that China might also assist Pakistan in the further 
weaponization process and by creating a credible minimum deterrent against India10 
though it has promised in May 1996 towards Washington no longer to assist 
unsafeguarded Pakistani nuclear facilities.11 
The Ghauri-missile project of Pakistan, however, was primarily developed with North 
Korea’s assistance, though Pakistan has denied to need any foreign support. Thus 
Japan’s Foreign Minister, Masahiko Komura, has accused Pakistan to import missiles 
from North Korea’s part of the country’s nuclear program.12  
South Asia seems at first glance very far from Northeast Asia and Japan. But the long 
distance is thus no longer a barrier against negative security impacts on Japan. The 
clandestine interregional Pakistani-North Korean proliferation network cooperating to 
evade international controls and sanctions is a good example for the increasing 
globalization of security policies. Besides the more well-known Chinese-Pakistani ties in 
the nuclear and missile field, the North Korean-Pakistani relationship dates back to the 
1970s. In the 1980s, both countries created stronger ties which included mutual military 
assistance to Iran during its eight-year war with Iraq. While North Korea acquired 
nuclear technology from Pakistan, Islamabad benefited primarily from ballistic missile 
technology from Pyongyang. Together with other Iranian specialists, Pakistani officials 
visited North Korea in 1992 and 1993 to observe No-dong missile development and 
                                            
8  See also Ahmed Rashid, ‘Comrades-in-Arms’, Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 25 June 1998, 
p. 13. 
9  See Nayan Chand et.al., ‘The Race is On’, ibid., 11 June 1998, pp. 20-22, here p. 22. 
10  Reportedly, Beijing assured Islamabad that bilateral military cooperation would continue, and offered 
its ”unqualified support” to Pakistan - see Ahmed Rashid/Shiraz Sidhva, ‘Might and Menace’, ibid., 4 
June 1998, p. 28 f., here p. 29. 
11  To China’s May 1996 pledge see also the interview with U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe 
Talbott, in: ibid., 18 June 1998, p.28. 
12  See Alexandra Harney/Farhan Bokhari, Financial Times (FT), 25 September 1998, p. 6. 
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tests.13 Pakistan’s Ghauri-missile program has reportedly been dated to Pakistan’s 
prime minister Benazir Bhutto’s visits to China and North Korea in December 1993 and 
started in early 1994.14 According to the U.S. expert Joseph S. Bermudez, Pakistan 
signed several agreements with North Korea in late 1993 which included transfers of 
Nodong-I technology, components and probably several missiles.15 In 1995, a North 
Korean military delegation visited Pakistan and finalized the agreement to provide 
Islamabad with critical missile components of its No-dong and Taep’o-dong rockets.16 
According to official U.S. sources, Pakistan purchased No-dong-I missiles from North 
Korea in a secret 1997 deal that caused the US administration to impose economic 
sanctions on May 4, 1998 against both countries.17 However, the USA was completely 
unaware of the Pakistani-North Korea proliferation linkages as US officials have 
conceded.18 
Although the extent of North Korea’s assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear development 
program remain unknown, the clandestine bilateral military technology cooperation 
finally seems to have resulted in an exchange of test data on both sides which was 
particular important for North Korea’s cash-strapped missile programs. Moreover, the 
Ghauri-missile was developed on the basis of North Korea’s Nodong-missiles and, 
reportedly, sold even completely to Pakistan in 1997. The liquid-fueled Ghauri missile is 
basically an enhanced version of the North Korean No-dong 1 (also called Rodong 1) 
missile which has a similar maximum range and itself is a Scud-derivate developed in 
Russia in the 1960s.19 In this light, North Korea and China contributed directly to South 
Asia’s accelerating nuclear arms race. 
Against this background, the Ghauri missile is based at least on key technologies 
smuggled from North Korea. Pakistan’s more ambitious missile project, called 
                                            
13  To the Pakistani-North Korean connection see in particular Joseph Bermudez, ‘A Silent partner’. 
14  See Wade Huntley, ‘The Proliferation Network’, NAPSNET, Special Report, 21 May 1998. 
15  See ibid, here p. 16 and Joseph S. Bermudez, Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK’, JDW, 20 
May 1998, pp.16-17, and idem, ‘Taepo-dong Launch Brings DPRK Missiles Back into the Spotlight’, 
JIR, October 1998, pp. 30-32, here p. 31. 
16  See Joseph Bermudez, ‘A Silent Partner’, here p. 17. 
17  See R.Jeffrey Smith, International Herald Tribune (IHT), 15 May 1998, p. 4. 
18  See Wade Huntley, The Proliferation Network’. 
19  See Tim Weiner, IHT, 5 April 1998, p. 5 
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Ghaznavi, with a range of 2,000km, might also benefit from incorporated technologies 
and components from the Taep’o-dong missiles.20  
Despite numerous efforts to curb any missile exports from North Korea, Pakistan as well 
as Iran have become a major market for North Korean missiles as the only way to 
Pyongyang to earn hard currency. Iran’s Shahab-3 missile benefited not only from 
technology imported from Russia and China, but also from Iran’s close missile 
collaboration with North Korea. It begun with establishing facilities for the maintenance 
and production of the Hwasong (Mars)-5, a reverse-engineered ‘Scud-B’ missile. Later, 
it was followed by its participation in North Korea’s No-dong-I program which allowed to 
transfer both technology and components into Iran’s missile program.21   
 
3. A Nuclear Superpower in Decline - Tendencies of Denuclearization and 
Nuclearization in Russia’s Security Policies 
3.1 The Denuclearization Efforts in the START Framework and the Constraints of the  
      Modernization of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces 
As the Russian minister for atomic energy, V. Mikhaylov, revealed for the first time in 
1993 that the Soviet Union had in 1987 approximately 45,000 nuclear warheads in its 
arsenal22 — 12,000 more than the CIA had accounted in the mid of 1980s. In mid-1993, 
the most reliable estimate, based on data from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) and the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy (MINATOM), specified the Russian 
nuclear legacy still on 32,000 strategic and tactical nuclear warheads. 15,000 of them 
are active, or deployed, and another 17,000 are in storage or awaiting disassembly and 
disposal.23 With the ratification of START-II, the nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Russia 
will be reduced to 3,500 to 3,000 warheads on each side. 
 
                                            
20  See Joseph S. Bermudez, ‘A Silent Partner’, here p. 17. 
21  See Joseph S. Bermudez, ‘Taepo-dong launch Brings DPRK Missiles Back into the Spotlight’, here p. 
30 f. 
22  See Moscow News 40/1993, 1 October 1993, p. 5. 
23  See ‘Nuclear Pursuits’, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, No. 4 (May) 1993, pp. 48-49; ‘Estimated 
Russian (CIS) Nuclear Stockpile (July 1993)’, ibid., No. 6 (July-August) 1993, p. 57, and D. 
Lockwood, ‘Report on Soviet Arsenal Raises Questions, Eyebrows’, Arms Control Today (ACT), No. 
9 (Nov.) 1993, p. 23. 
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Table: Reductions and Limits of Strategic Nuclear Warheads according to START-I and -II 
 Mid 1991 START-I START II 
 U.S.A USSR/RF U.S.A USSR/RF U.S.A USSR/RF 
ICBMs       2,450      6,612      1,444      3,258       500       795 
SLBMs       5,760      2,804      3,456      1,744     1,728     1,744 
Bomber       2,665        855      1,066         820        772        461 
Total       10,875    10,271      5,966      5,687     3,500      3,000 
Source: Frank Umbach, ‘Die nukleare Rüstungskontrollproblematik und die Rolle der USA im postsowjetischen 
Raum’, in: BIOst (Ed.), Zwischen Krise und Konsolidierung. Gefaehrdeter Systemwechsel im Osten Europas 
(Muenchen-Wien: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1995), pp. 360-371, here p. 360. 
 
 
 
As former President Boris Yeltsin and his successor, Vladimir Putin, have repeatedly 
declared Russia would like to initiate following START-III negotiations to downsize the 
nuclear arsenals of both sides to less than 1,500 warheads whereas the U.S. has 
announced not to go further than 2,000 warheads.  
At the same time and in a striking contrast to Russia’s denuclearization efforts for its 
strategic nuclear arsenal, nuclear weapons in general have become the last symbol of 
the former superpower status in Russia. Consequently to that fact and the disastrous 
state of Russia’s conventional armed forces, preparation for nuclear war with the USA 
appears to remain a high priority for the Russian military establishment and for defining 
a new military doctrine and nuclear strategy as we will see below.  
In order to strengthen the ”negative control” and to prevent any further erosion of its 
crippling command and control system, Russia has basically two options: (1) to lower 
the status of alert (de-alerting) of its Strategic Nuclear Forces, and/or (2) to change the 
doctrine of its national nuclear strategy and to reject all hair-trigger and accident prone 
”launch-on-warning” postures of the Cold War on which Russia traditionally relied on 
and which still dominates its nuclear control system. Russia has taken only the first 
choice and has reduced the status of alert of its nuclear arsenal instead of favoring 
option two or going even further (in cooperation with the United States) to an end-state 
of zero alert — so-called ”virtual arsenals” (disassembled weapons under multilateral 
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inspection and monitoring).24 The complete mutual detargeting of all strategic missiles 
on 30 May 1994 was the result of the bilateral agreement signed by US President Bill 
Clinton and Boris Yeltsin four months before. But it was rather a political and symbolic 
step towards the West which has been reiterated by Yeltsin in May 1997 during his 
Paris visit.25 Militarily, this information can be retargeted in minutes if not seconds. Thus 
the agreement produced no significant changes in the operational launch readiness on 
both sides which are still regularly exercised. 
Regardless of the Duma’s ratification of START-II in April 2000 and the consolidation 
efforts of Russia’s nuclear armed forces (such as the integration of the Strategic Missile 
Forces, the Missile Space Forces and the Missile Space Defense Force into a single 
branch or the creation of a unified combat control system to provide centralized and 
stable control over all elements of the integrated Strategic Missile Forces26), a decade 
from now Russia probably will have less than 1,000 warheads in its strategic nuclear 
arsenal as the result of the economic situation and its scarce financial resources. Even 
the core of its strategic nuclear deterrence forces, the Strategic Missile Forces, thus will 
shrink dramatically in the years ahead.27 According to Aleksei G. Arbatov in 1998, with 
the implementation of START-II, Russia will not have more than 1,200-1,500 warheads 
in 2003 (the timetable for the implementation of START-I has been extended to the end 
of 2007) because it is unable to deploy 700-1,000 additional warheads and SS-25 
missiles at a rate of 100-200 per year.28 At the same time, however, thousands of 
strategic and tactical nuclear warheads are still waiting in storage’s for their dismantling. 
At present, Russia has neither the financial resources to maintain a nuclear arsenal 
equivalent to that of the United States nor sufficient funds for dismantling all the nuclear 
warheads of the Cold War. Even the ratified START-I agreement has only 40 per cent 
                                            
24  To those proposals see Bruce Blair, ‘Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces’ and idem., ‘Command, 
Control, and Warning for Virtual Arsenals’, in: Michael J. Mazarr (Ed.), ‘Nuclear Weapons in a 
Transformed World. The Challenge of Virtual Nuclear Arsenals’ (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 
pp.55-75, here pp. 62 ff. 
25  To the confusing statement (as one of many others by Yeltsin) see the reaction in the Russian press 
by Dmitrii Gornostaev, Nezavisimaya gazeta (NG), 29 May 1997, pp.1-2 and Pavel Felgenhauer, 
Segodnya, 28 May 1997, p. 3. 
26  See Ilshat Maichurin/N. Poroskov, Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 November 1997, p. 1. 
27  See also analyses by the Russian General Staff, reported by Dmitriy Gornostaev/Andrei Korbut, NG, 
4 December 1997, pp.1-2 and Yevgeni Fedorov, Kommersant, 20 January 1998, pp. 23-26. 
28  See Aleksei Arbatov, ‘Military Reform in Russia. Dilemmas, Obstacles, and Prospects’, International 
Security, Spring 1998, pp. 83-134, here p. 116 f. 
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been funded by Russia’s federal budget while the present restricted modernization 
efforts of its nuclear forces will take up already 28 per cent of the defense budget.29 
According to Russian data, up to 80-90 percent of all military expenditures of the 
defense budgets in the 1990s were spent on strategic weapons branches, primarily the 
RVSN, which Marshal Igor Sergeev commanded before he became Defense Minister.30 
Therewith, Russia has tried to keep purchasing at least 20-30 ICBMs a year — but 
more than all other nuclear powers altogether — to maintain its nuclear super power 
status into the 21st century.31 
Moreover, other important tasks such as improving reliability and safe nuclear weapon 
use or Russia’s missile early warning capabilities (which are in a poor state and only 
capable to maintain coverage for 21 hours a day) have not received the much needed 
attention.32 In this regard, the creation of joint missile attack reciprocal notification and 
warning centers in Russia and the U.S., as it has already been agreed, is of utmost 
importance for the survival of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces rather than being 
merely downgraded to just a ”Confidence and Security Building Measure (CSBM)”. 
Russia’s refusal to ratify START-II is in the light of the financial implications of the treaty 
on its future Strategic Nuclear Forces to some extent understandable, but ultimately 
urgently necessary for its entire armed forces: politically important for a reliable security-
policy in the future; economically as a cornerstone for the future budget planning as a 
pre-condition for any military reforms; and militarily important simply to the fact that 
Russia needs START-II more than the U.S. does: the expiration  date for Russia’s 
strategic missile arsenal will have been reached by 2007-2008, while it will be for the 
U.S. only in 2020-2025; according to Russian sources, in 2008-2010, the U.S. 
maximum number of warheads might be four to six times greater than Russia’s (which 
will have great difficulties sustaining even 1,000 strategic nuclear warheads) whilst the 
combined nuclear potential of France and Great Britain may exceed Russia by 2010-
                                            
29  See Interfax, 28 September 1999. 
30  See Oleg Odnokolenko, Segodnya, 23 September 1999, p. 1. 
31  See Pavel Felgenhauer, Moscow Times, 20 July 2000. 
32  To the problems and challenges of Russia’s early warning systems, but denying that Russia is 
becoming partially blind, see the interview with RVSN Commander-in-Chief, Vladimir Yakovlev, in: 
Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie-NG (NVO), No. 32, 20-26 August 1999, pp.1 and 6. 
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2015.33 That explains Russia’s interest to reduce the strategic nuclear arsenal of each 
side in forthcoming START-III negotiations even further to 1,000 or 1,500 warheads 
than the U.S. side is proposing (2,500-2,000 warheads). Nonetheless, Russia’s refusal 
to ratify START-II during the last years was another indicator for Russia’s traditional 
superpower mentality, which remains deeply rooted and entrenched as part of the 
”patriotic consensus” especially in the communist and nationalistic circles in the Duma. 
Moreover, with the ratification of START-I and -II and the financial pressure to downsize 
Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal, a radical restructuring is under way with the result 
that most of Russia’s strategic nuclear warheads in the future will be based on mobile-
ICBMs and SLBMs. Although these nuclear weapon systems will strengthen the nuclear 
deterrence effect (because they are more invulnerable than silo-based ICBMs), 
simultaneously it risks to further weaken Russia’s command and control safeguard 
system (because safeguards on mobile-ICBMs and SLBMs on submarines are inferior 
to those on silo-based ICBMs given communication problems and their vulnerable 
links).34 
Furthermore, Russia needs urgently its limited procurement budget for concentrating on 
critical systems and upgrades of the C3I structure. Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces 
are becoming more and more blind as aging surveillance satellites and radar system 
need replacement. With a decaying early warning system, the danger of false alarms is 
growing during a time, when Russia’s declining Strategic Nuclear Forces remain poised 
on hair-trigger alert, ready to fire at a moment’s notice (launch-on-warning).35 Russia 
relies more than ever on using its strategic nuclear weapon systems first or launching 
them on warning of hostile missile attack. As Bruce Blair has repeatedly argued: 
Russia’s ”growing reliance [on nuclear weapons] has not only lowered the nuclear 
threshold for intentional use but also increased the danger of mistaken or unauthorized 
use of nuclear weapons.”36 That was already the case in January 1995 when a 
                                            
33  See ‘US ‘Not Interested’ in Russia’s Ratifying START II’, Interfax (Moscow), 23 August 1999. To a 
balanced analysis by Russian experts see Vladimir Bogomolov/Sergei Kortunov, ‘Russian Nuclear 
Strategy’, International Affairs (Moscow) 2/1998, pp. 23-37. 
34  See Bruce Blair, ‘Command, Control, and Warning for Virtual Arsenals’, here p. 61. 
35  Russian specialists in control of the ”Kazbek” system for the country’s nuclear weapons have warned 
that the system needs urgently repair, but there are no funds available – see Kirill Belyaninov, Noviye 
Izvestia, 2 July 1999, pp. 1 and 7. 
36  Bruce Blair/Clifford Gaddy, ‘Russia’s Aging War Machine. Economic Weakness and the Nuclear 
Threat’, Brooking Reviews, Summer 1999, pp. 10-13, here p. 12. 
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Norwegian weather rocket started and inadvertently alarmed Russia’s Strategic Nuclear 
Forces. For the very first time since the Cold War, it triggered a heightened level of alert 
throughout its nuclear forces, including for the activation of the nuclear briefcase by 
President Boris Yeltsin.37 The Russian Defense Ministry hopes now with another draft 
law on the problems of the space complex, entitled ”On Funding the Strategic Nuclear 
Forces of the Russian Federation until 2010”, to improve its space missile defense 
capabilities (including early warning means). By 2010, the military assumes to have 
restored the combat potential of its Strategic Nuclear Forces.38 
As the infighting between Defense Minister Igor Sergeev and the Chief of the General 
Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin has demonstrated over the last 18 months39, considerable 
disagreements exist about the future direction and concrete steps of Russia’s military 
reform. As long as Russia’s economic decay is continuing, Russia’s armed forces are 
largely unable to play a powerful and lasting role in its foreign and security policies any 
longer. Even the Ministry’s own, most optimistic projections, only see it beginning to 
receive adequate funding in 2004. After the financial crisis broke out in August 1998, 
even those calculations are no longer realistic. The virtual collapse of Russian state 
finances since that time has made any effective military reform even more doubtful.40 As 
the result of the domestic uncertainties, for the first time since 1991, details of the 1999 
defense budget were classified again.41 At the same time, Russia has nevertheless 
ambitious rearmament plans as the report of the General Staff at Russia’s Defense 
Ministry, entitled ”Prognosis for Financial and Economic Support of Military Construction 
until 2010”42, from early 1999 (before the outbreak of the Kosovo war) is indicating. If 
the Russian government will confirm this blueprint, military expenditures would rise from 
2.6 per cent of Russia’s GDP to between 6.0 and 6.5 per cent by 2005.43  
                                            
37  To details of that crisis see F.Umbach, ‘Nuclear Proliferation Modernization and Proliferation 
Challenges’, here p. 77 f.  
38  This document is to some extent unique because it is the first time that funding for a military program 
has become the subject of a federal law - see also Vladimir Yermolin, Izvestiya, 17 June 1999, p. 2. 
39  To the background see also Vladimir Ivanov, NG, 2 October 1999, p. 11. 
40  See also F.Umbach, ‘Russia as a ‘Virtual Great Power’: Implications for Its Declining Role in 
European and Eurasian Security’, European Security, No. 3, Autumn 2000, pp. 87-122, here pp. 97 
ff. 
41  See IISS (Ed.), ‘The Military Balance 1999-2000’ (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 
pp. 104-118, here p. 108 ff. 
42  See NVO, 5-11 February 1999. 
43  See also Richard F. Staar, ‘A Russian Rearmament Wish List’, Orbis, Fall 1999, pp. 605-612, here p. 
606. 
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While the official overall strength has been reduced to 1.2 million by January 1, 1999, 
and most recently to not more than 850,000 soldiers of Russia’s regular armed forces, 
today only about one third or even one fourth of that strength can be considered 
genuinely operational. Without the political will to make drastic cuts, Moscow will instead 
maintain a largely non-operational military machine that will even deepen the severe 
structural weaknesses of the Russian armed forces dating back to Soviet times.44 Given 
the available budget, a further reduction of the regular armed forces to some 600,000 
will be necessary at the beginning of the next decade.45 Although the adopted common 
policy guidelines on military issues of the ”National Security Concept” of December 
1997 stated that, even if all of Russia armed forces (including those not belong to the 
Defense Ministry) are mobilized, Russia can cope with at best just one regional conflict. 
And even that case has become more and more doubtful during the last two years.  
 
3.2 The Nuclearization Tendencies in Russia’s Security and Defense Policies 
Russia already dropped the pledge on its 1982 ”no-first use”-policy of nuclear weapons 
in the document ”Principle Guidance on the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” 
in November 1993.46 At that time, it has already underlined the increasing role of 
Russia’s strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in its defense policies.47 Since the 
beginning of the 1990s and in the light of the Gulf-war, many Russian security and 
defense experts advocate have placed a greater reliance on nuclear weapons to 
compensate for the deficiencies of conventional forces. Not only strategic nuclear 
weapons, but also tactical nuclear weapons play a much more important role presently 
in Russia’s defense posture, and particularly in the Far East towards China. Aleksei 
Arbatov, for instance, has argued in 1997: 
                                            
44  To the prospects of Russia’s military reform see in particular Aleksei G. Arbatov, ‘Voennaya reforma: 
doktrina, voiska, finansy’, Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya (MEiMO) 4/1997, pp. 
5-21 and idem, ‘Military Reform in Russia’.  
45  See also Segodnya, 14 February 1998. 
46  The document in: Izvestiya, 18 November 1993, pp. 1-4. It has modified the 1982 Soviet pledge not 
to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states (as a denuclearized Ukraine) - see also Dunbar 
Lockwood, ‘Russia Revises Nuclear Policy, Ends Soviet ‘No-First-Use’ Pledge’, ACT, December 
1993, p.19. The Russian Minister of Defence, Army-General Pavel Grachev, declared it already in an 
article four months earlier, see Krasnaya zvezda, 9 June 1995, pp. 1 and 5.  
47  See, inter alia, Vladimir Belous, ‘Key Aspects of the Russian Nuclear Strategy’, Security Dialogue 
2/1997, pp. 159-171 and Nikolai Sokov, ‘Russia’s Approach to Nuclear Weapons’, The Washington 
Quarterly 3/1996, pp. 107-114. 
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”Chinese conventional build up greatly depends on massive imports of weapons and 
technology from Russia. Thus, besides the nuclear threat, Moscow has effective means of 
undercutting or at least seriously slowing down the emergence of this hypothetical threat. 
At a minimum, to deter effectively China’s conventional offensive superiority at the theatre, 
Russia might rely on the option of employing tactical nuclear weapons in the border area 
to thwart the enemy’s offensive operations while deterring China’s nuclear response at the 
strategic level by superior (assured destruction) strategic retaliatory capabilities. Then 
Russia’s deterrence would be credible: its nuclear capabilities would be sufficient to deny 
China’s alleged military gains at the theatre but not threatening to its national survival and 
thus would not provoke its strategic nuclear pre-emption.”48 
The new emphasis on the role of nuclear weapons has also been confirmed in Russia’s 
”National Security Concept”49, signed by President Boris Yeltsin on December 17, 1997, 
and in new military doctrine and strategy proposals since that time. It suggests an 
overwhelming reliance on nuclear forces of a host of military-political contingencies 
(including the right to use them as first strike and sometimes even for the preemptive 
use in ethno-political conflicts) that these forces cannot realistically and effectively 
confront.50 Characteristically for the increasing role of strategic and tactical nuclear 
weapons — which mostly (at least 6,000 operational warheads plus thousands in 
storage) have not been destroyed as former President Mikhail Gorbachev had pledged 
in October 1991 (an reiterated by Boris Yeltsin in 1992) — in Russia’s military planning 
is also the fact that the current restructuring of Russia’s armed forces has been 
conducted under the slogan ”military reform under the nuclear missile umbrella.”51 In 
this light, Russia places too much emphasis on nuclear scenarios (which are mostly 
unrealistic and do not solve any of its most important security problems at its southern 
flank) in order to justify its declining world power status without having the means to 
control them effectively.  
Russia’s foremost security perception and the resulting commitment to prepare forces 
able to fight low-intensify conflicts at home (especially at its southern flank) — as it has 
been outlined in the old National Security Concept of 1997 — has been replaced by a 
continued determination to maintain a modern nuclear capability which serves Russia’s 
status as a nuclear world power (i.e. in the UN-Security Council) as well as deterrence 
                                            
48  Aleksei G. Arbatov, ‘Virtual Arsenals’, in: Michael J. Mazarr (Ed.), Nuclear Weapons in a Transformed 
World, pp. 319-336, here p. 331. 
49  See ‘Kontseptsiya natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 26 
December 1997, pp. 4-5. 
50  See also Aleksei G. Arbatov, ‘Voennaya reforma: doktrina, voiska, finansy’, here p. 8. 
51  Pavel Felgengauer, Segodnya, 23 October 1997, p. 1.  
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functions vis-à-vis superior conventional armed forces of NATO in Europe and China in 
East Asia. Moreover, nuclear weapons designer, confronted with the fact that their 
country can no longer afford such as vast nuclear weapon archipelago like in Soviet 
times, are lobbying presently together with General Staff officers to build a new 
generation of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons for use on a battlefield, which is seen 
as Moscow’s answer to its lack of high-precision-conventional weapon systems.52  
But given Russia’s economic and financial constraints, a further modernization of its 
Strategic Nuclear Forces and tactical nuclear arsenal thus would deepen the underlying 
problem that it would come at the further expense of its conventional forces. It would 
result in a continued degradation of morale and operational effectiveness in times, when 
Russia will have to cope with a lasting extreme violent ethnic conflict in the Northern 
Caucasus — a conflict with no peaceful solution in sight at all in the foreseeable future.  
But as the second Chechen war as Russia’s worst security crisis now demonstrates 
once again, its main security challenge has much more to do with low-intensity conflicts 
than with a ”virtual NATO threat” or a nuclear preemptive strike of the U.S. strategic 
nuclear forces. Neither strategic not tactical nuclear weapons will help Russia to deter 
and fight those conflicts. Thus Russia may have a credible nuclear deterrent but it is 
increasingly becoming vulnerable to attack by a well-trained guerrilla armies such as in 
the North Caucasus.53  
But newly discussed plans to develop a new generation of nuclear munitions with low-
yield and super-low-yield, obviously delivered to targets by both strategic and tactical 
delivery systems (such as the newly developed Iskander 400 km short-range missile 
system), the nuclear part of the pompous Zapad-99 exercise in the ”Western Theater of 
Operations” in June 1999 (the biggest and most costly exercise since 1985! and 
directed against a NATO-aggression ”preceded by a powerful information warfare” in 
North and Central Europe) as well as the seriously debated use of nuclear (and 
chemical) weapons in the current war in Dagestan/Chechnya seem all to confirm that 
Moscow priorities tend rather toward a further ”nuclearization of Russia’s defense 
                                            
52  See Pavel Felgengauer, Segodnya, 6 May 1999, pp. 1-2 and David Hoffman, IHT, 1 September 
1999. 
53  See also Vadim Soloviov, NG, 8 May 1999, pp. 1 and 3. 
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policy”.54 As Russian defense experts have discussed, it could be the Russian answer 
to its lack of high-precision non-nuclear weapon systems (used by NATO during the 
Kosovo war), which are defined by Russian defense experts as ”strategic deterrence 
weapons” and the new ”God of War”.55 But whether these new nuclear weapons can 
really be used effectively and justified politically in any low-intensity conflicts is more 
than doubtful. These non-nuclear strategic weapons systems might have militarily some 
positive deterrent effects, but have also many negative implications, in particular if one 
takes into account the increasing asymmetrical conventional military balance for Russia:  
”Within the context of deterrence of major non-nuclear aggression using nuclear 
weapons (in the presence of an asymmetry of conventional forces): The threshold of 
nuclear weapon use is determined by the level of potential of conventional forces 
with respect to enemy potential, and so a high asymmetry of conventional forces 
lowers the threshold of nuclear weapons use and elevates the danger of use of 
nuclear weapons even in low-level conflicts.”56  
While President Boris Yeltsin chaired a ”super secret session” of the Kremlin Security 
Council in April 1999 that discussed this issue, so far nothing has been made public. 
The Security Council, however, had already approved in July 1998 the structure of 
Russia’s nuclear deterrence forces until 2010. In December 1998, finally, new major 
provisions of Russia’s nuclear deterrence policy had been adopted. The concept has 
been called ”Main Policy Guidelines of the Russian Federation in the Area of Nuclear 
Deterrence” and has been set forth on March 15, 1999 by Deputy Secretary of the 
Security Council Viktor Mikhailov.57 But the concept itself has not been published. 
Nonetheless, it became clear what has been discussed in general. As Alexander Golts 
lamented, the West knew ”that Moscow is not going to push the nuclear button because 
of Yugoslavia”. Therefore, the session in April 1999 was dedicated to the discussion of 
non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons because ”the threat of a global nuclear 
                                            
54  To these plans see ‘Letter of June 1999. Security Council Meeting: What Is Under the Veil of 
Secrecy?’, PIR Arms Control Letters, Moscow, 9 June 1999 (via Internet: 
http://pircenter.org/acl/messages/ 65.html); Richard Paddoc, Los Angeles Times, 14 September 1999 
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55  See also David Hoffmann, Washington Post, 31 August 1999, p. A1. 
56  Yevgeniy A. Fedosov/Igor D. Spasskiy, NVO, July 23-29, 1999, p. 6. 
57  See ‘Letter of June 1999. Security Council Meeting: What Is Under the Veil of Secrecy?’. 
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catastrophe failed to impress NATO, but the specter of a limited [nuclear] war may just 
do the trick.”58 
Many Russian security and defense experts advocate a greater reliance on tactical 
nuclear weapons to compensate for the deficiencies of its conventional forces. Not only 
strategic nuclear weapons, but also tactical nuclear weapons play a much more 
important role in Russia’s defense posture, and particularly in the Far East towards 
China. As Dmitri Trenin has confirmed: ”Some Russian military officers privately admit in 
a conflict with China the main Russian defenses along the border, including all the 
principal cities, will be overrun in a matter of days, leaving the General Staff with few 
options other than going nuclear.”59 According to James Clay Moltz in 1997, 
approximately 1,259 Russian nuclear warheads were still based in the region, deployed 
on air-launched cruise-missiles, land-based missiles, and SLBMs.60  
But even a nuclear deterrence against China might become more questionable over the 
next decade, given Russia’s great difficulties sustaining even 900 strategic nuclear 
warheads after 2008-2010. Although China has currently only some 300 strategic 
nuclear warheads and additional 150 tactical nuclear warheads, it could theoretically 
expand its nuclear forces (by acquiring and implementing the MIRV technology) two or 
three times of its present size to some 600-900 strategic nuclear warheads within the 
next decade (see also the following chapter about China’s nuclear modernization 
efforts). It seems also to have an interest to modernize and increase its arsenal of 
tactical nuclear weapons.61 If China will indeed expand its strategic and tactical nuclear 
arsenals, Russia’s nuclear deterrence would become automatically more questionable, 
particularly when it is part of an evolving concept of limited nuclear deterrence that links 
conventional and nuclear warfare. 
Furthermore, even nowadays the use of Russia‘s present tactical nuclear arsenal is 
very questionable because of the vicinity of almost all major Russian cities and military 
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headquarters to the common border with China.62 They were already in the past, during 
the 1960s and the times of a potential military conflict between China and Russia, very 
vulnerable to a massive large-scale surprise attack by the PLA as many Russian 
military experts concluded. The use of non-strategic nuclear forces is only deterrent 
when Moscow would use longer-range tactical nuclear weapons that threaten China’s 
hinterland and major cities but not along the common border. Recognizing these 
defense dilemmas at its potential eastern front, Russia seems to develop a new 
generation of tactical nuclear weapons and munitions with low-yield and super-low-
yield, obviously delivered to targets by both strategic and tactical delivery systems such 
as the newly developed Iskander 400 km short-range missile system. In 1999, Russia 
conducted seven subcritical tests on Novaya Zemlya and will continue to do it even 
more until the end of this year.63  
Hence, reliance on the nuclear factor and umbrella do not necessarily guarantee 
Russia’s national security under all circumstances, including vis-à-vis potential threats 
by China. Andrei Piontkovsky, director of the Center for National Security Research, 
and Vitaly Tsigichko, a wellknown and leading security specialist of the System Analysis 
of the Russian Academy of Scienes, have warned and criticized the new military 
doctrine in May 2000 as follows: 
”As far as the Far Eastern sector is concerned, we are following a very strange 
tradition to avoid an analysis of the capabilities of the Russian and Chinese armed 
forces. ... Such analysis is a necessary element for creating a system of stability. 
Considering Russia and China, one reaches the conclusion that it is a classical 
case, when the superiority in ordinary weapons (China) can be deterred by the 
threat of nuclear weapons.  
But this analysis does not take in consideration such parameter as ‘inadmissible 
damage’. ... Considering the potential Russian-Chinese conflict from this point of 
view, we will have to give up the idea that a threat of nuclear weapons can frighten 
the enemy. If we come into conflict with China, it has a good chance of winning, 
except in one instance: a total nuclear war, which would destroy both sides. 
The Russian conception, which relies on the nuclear factor, is not a guarantee of the 
country’s security. This conception is ineffective in all aspects as regards possible 
conflicts.”64 
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Russia’s willingness to trade long-term strategic interests for short-term commercial 
benefits might backfire on Russia itself because the relative weakness of Russia and 
the increasing power of China will become clearer in the next decades. If Russia will not 
economically revive with a substantial growth in the next decade (which seems rather 
unlikely65), it will not have the financial resources to modernize and rebuild its armed 
forces – an expectation and intention which today are used to justify its present high-
tech arms exports and military-technology transfers to China. Russia’s technological 
superiority over ”backward China”, historically an important leverage of and reassurance 
for Moscow’ foreign policies in Asia, is now becoming history - and much faster than 
Russia’s political and military elite seems to realize. In this regard, history seems not to 
offer any lessons for Russia. The Soviet assistance to China in developing its own 
nuclear weapons, for instance, has saved Beijing between 10-15 years.66 All these 
strategic developments under way have already dramatically reversed the geopolitical 
dynamics of Eurasia as a whole with wide-ranging implications not only for both 
countries, but also for regional and global affairs. Historically, it would not be the first 
time that Moscow and even the Russian military high command have underestimated 
China’s modernization progress of its nuclear and conventional armed forces. 
Nonetheless, Russia’s reliance on the increasing role of Russia’s strategic and tactical 
nuclear weapons in its defense policies has recently been confirmed by Russia’s new 
”National Security Concept” of January 200067 and its new military doctrine of April 
2000.68 The latter document states that Russia must have a potential for nuclear 
deterrence ensuring ”the infliction of required damage to any aggressor, either state or a 
coalition, under any circumstances.”69 Although the final version of the doctrine doesn’t 
mention directly Russia’s right to the first use of nuclear weapons, the document makes 
clear that ”the Russian Federation keeps the right to use nuclear weapons in response 
to the use of nuclear arms and other WMD against it or its allies, and in response to a 
                                            
65  See also F. Umbach, ‘Russia as a ‘Virtual Great Power’.   
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large-scale aggression with the use of conventional arms in situations critical for the 
national security of the Russian Federation.”70 Furthermore, as the doctrine demands:  
”Under present-day conditions the Russian Federation proceeds on the basis of the 
need to have a nuclear potential capable of guaranteeing a set level of damage to any 
aggressor (state or coalition of states) under any circumstances. ... 
The Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops should be prepared to repulse 
aggression, effectively engage an aggressor, and conduct active operations (both 
defence and offensive) under any scenario for the unleashing and waging wars and 
armed conflicts, under conditions of the massive use by the enemy of modern and 
advanced combat weapons, including weapons of mass destruction of all types.”71 
However, the vagueness of the phrase ”critical situations” to national security enables 
Moscow de facto to interpret it relatively freely (though the draft version of the military 
doctrine, published in October 1999, was even more ambiguous in this regard), as 
critical Russian military experts have concluded.72  
 
3.3 A Strategic Alliance Between Russia and China in Regard to NMD and TMD? 
At the same time, the Russian-Chinese relationship have undergone a remarkable 
transformation during the last decade, including a congruence of strategic agendas, 
accompanied by congruence in strategic cultures: China supported Moscow’s 
opposition to NATO’s eastward expansion; Moscow supported China’s opposition to the 
1996 revised U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and its guidelines for mutual defense 
cooperation.73 Furthermore, Russia and China warned repeatedly in 1999 the U.S. to 
develop BMD and TMD umbrellas (the latter together with Japan and, possibly, Taiwan) 
which would threaten all nuclear and non-proliferation treaties (in particular ABM and 
CTBT).74 However, both countries oppose — but to a different degree due to their 
specific national defense dilemmas — Washington’s plans for a national and theater 
ballistic missile defense system. Thus Russia is much more concerned about a NMD 
rather than a TMD system. That explains Putin’s proposal to build a joint TMD system 
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with the U.S. and Europe or even a joint NMD system with the U.S. which clearly is not 
in China’s strategic interests. Russia’s concerns towards a U.S. TMD system in East 
Asia is only related to potential impacts on China’s defense policies because it might 
fuel (rather than just to stimulate) a faster modernization of its nuclear forces (which is 
already under way and started long before the U.S. TMD and NMD plans have been 
discussed since the mid of the 1990s), including to build MIRV-nuclear warheads.75 
Moreover, Putin’s unilateral proposal to develop a joint missile defense system for 
Europe with NATO and the U.S. caught Beijing by surprise. It provoked Chinese 
comments to remind Moscow at the ”common interests of all countries.” Thereupon 
China declared to object ”any” changes of the ABM-treaty, including from the Russian 
side.76 In this light, the ”Joint Statement on ABM”, issued by both presidents during their 
Beijing summit in July 2000, seems an attempt of both sides to restore rather than to 
deepen their strategic relationship in regard to the U.S. missile defense plans and a 
revision of the ABM treaty.77 Already before, during the Moscow visit of China’s Defense 
Minister Chi Haotian in January 2000, Moscow had to reassure China by confirming 
”unconditional adherence to all agreements reached during earlier summits.”78 
4. China’s Nuclear Modernization Efforts and Its Ambiguous Non-Proliferation 
and Arms Control Policies 
4.1 On the Way to Become a Nuclear Superpower? – The Evolution of China’s Nuclear  
      Force Development 
Since the beginning of its nuclear weapon programs in the mid-1950s and the first 
nuclear weapon explosion on 16 October 1964, China has always given priority for 
developing and modernizing its nuclear arsenal. Two years later, it launched its first 
nuclear missile on 25 October 1966, and detonated its first hydrogen Bomb on 14 June 
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www.stratfor.com/asia/commentary/0006090259), ) 9 June 2000. 
77  See ‘Joint Statement on ABM Issue by the Presidents of the People’s Republic of China and the 
Russian Federation’, Stratfor.Com (via Internet: 
www.stratfor.com/asia/countries/china/RussiaChinaJointStmn.htm), 18 July 2000 and ‘Beijing 
Declaration by the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation’, ibid. (via Internet: 
www.stratfor.com/asia/countries/china/BeijingDeclaration.htm), 18 July 2000. 
78  See Alexander Shaburkin, NG, 19 January 2000, p. 2. 
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1967. Today, the number of nuclear weapons is still one of the most closely guarded 
secrets in China’s security policy. In the Chinese view, transparency is not in the 
interest of militarily ”weak” or medium-sized nuclear states (in comparison to nuclear 
superpowers). According to most of the Western sources, China has currently not more 
than 300 deployed nuclear warheads — which is ten times less than the strategic 
nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia after the ratification of START-II — on 
some 70-100 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and about 120 medium-
range bombers (Tu-16 ‘Badger’).79 Although China, too, has build up a nuclear triad, 
most of the nuclear warheads are deployed on IRBMs and ICBMs. Most of China's 
ballistic missiles have a range of not more than 3,000 km, 20 have a range of 4,800 km 
and probably not more than seven ICBMs are believed to have a range of roughly 
13,000 km and therewith the capability to reach the U.S. territory beyond the west 
coast. In addition, estimations suggest another stored 150 ground-launched tactical 
warheads.80 
Given the facts that the PLA is confronted with a technology lag of 20 years behind the 
West81, China’s missiles are believed to be far less accurate and thereby are still lacking 
the capability to deliver multiple warheads to separate targets (MIRV). The first and 
second-generation of research and development stages to deployment of Chinese 
nuclear weapons took around 11 years. The next stage to deploy the third generation of 
Chinese nuclear weapons might take even longer, but at the end will certainly narrow 
the technology lag to the West.  
 
                                            
79 See SIPRI (Ed.), ‘Yearbook 1996: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security’ (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 619; Leonhard S. Spector/Mark G. McDonough/Evan S. Medeiros, 
‘Tracking Nuclear Proliferation’, here pp. 49 ff.; The Defence Agency of Japan (Ed.), ‘Defence of 
Japan. White Paper’ (Tokyo: Defence Agency/Japan Times, Ltd., July 1995), here p. 52 and ‘Chinese 
Nuclear and Conventional Forces 1993’, ACT, December 1993, p. 29. IISS (Ed.), ‘The Military 
Balance 1996/97’ (London/IISS: Oxford University Press, October 1996) numbers Chinese IRBMs on 
70+ systems. However, some estimates are much higher – see ‘Size of China’s Ballistic Missile 
Force’, Center for Defense and International Studies, via Internet: 
http://www.cdiss.org/chinabms.htm. 
80 See Robert S. Norris/Andrew S. Burrows/Richard W. Fieldhouse, ‘Nuclear Weapons Databook, 
Volume V: British, French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons’ (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 
358 and Table 1.7, p. 11. 
81 See also RIPS (Ed.), ‘Asian Security Survey 1995-96’ (London-Washington: Brassey's, 1996), here p. 
23. 
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Table: China’s Strategic Nuclear Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs/SLBMs82: < 5,500km) 
 
Type/ 
Name 
Range 
(km) 
Payload 
(kg) 
Number CEP 
(m) 
Fuel Additional Comments 
DF-5A 
(1981) 
13,000+ 3,200 18-26 - Liquid liquid-silo based ICBM; 
modification with an 8 MIRV-
warheads feasible 
DF-31 
(2002-05) 
8,000 700 0 - Solid Road-Mobile ICBM with MIRV-
warheads; tested in August 1999 and 
November 2000; likely deployment 
by 2002-2005 
DF-41  
(2005-10) 
12,000 800 0 - Solid Mobile-based ICBM with MIRV-
warheads; will replace DF-5; likely 
deployment between 2005-2010 
 Julang-2 
(2005 ff.) 
8,000 700 0 - Solid Solid-fuel SLBM, based on the DF-
31; likely deployment not before 
2005 
Sources: Wyn Bowen/Stanley Shepard, ‘Living under the Red Missile Threat’, JIR, December 1996, pp. 560-564, 
here p.563; and ‘British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Forces’, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
November/December 1996, pp. 64-67, here p. 67; Richard D. Fisher, ‘China Increases Its Missile Forces While 
Opposing U.S. Missile Defense’, Backgrounder, The Heritage Foundation, No. 1268, 7 April 1999; Richard D. 
Fisher/Baker Spring, ‘China’s Nuclear and Missile Espionage Heightens the Need for Missile Defense’, ibid, No. 
1303, 2 July 1999 and David M. Lampton/Gregory C. May, ‘A Big Power Agenda for East Asia: America, China, 
and Japan’ (Washington D.C.: The Nixon Center, December 2000, here pp. 22 and 81). 
 
The question is only to which extent. But ultimately neither the transition phase nor the 
final stage of China’s ambitious modernization programs for its conventional and 
nuclear armed forces are reassuring for Beijing’s neighbors. 
China’s nuclear strategy is currently still based de facto on a ”counter city” second-strike 
capability.83 But its future nuclear strategy might rather be based on a ”flexible 
response” and ”limited deterrence” posture similar to NATO’s in the 1980s according to 
convincing Western analysis. According to Chinese advocates of a ”flexible response” 
and ”limited deterrence” strategy, the Clausewitz dictum that warfare is the continuation 
of politics exaggerates the uncontrollability of nuclear war and is leading to undermine 
                                            
82  Ranges according IISS; Chinese definitions: short-range (< 1.000 km); medium-range (1.000-3.000 
km); long-range (3.000-8000 km); intercontinental-range (< 8.000 km). 
83 See D. Lockwood, 'The Status of U.S., Russian and Chinese Nuclear Forces in Northeast Asia', here 
p. 23. 
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the credibility of China’s deterrence policy.84 Internal discussions of nuclear strategy 
have indicated China’s doctrine shifts since 1985 from an early, large scale and all-
encompassing ”people’s war”, based on an attrition strategy, to local and limited wars 
under high-tech conditions around China’s periphery. According to U.S. experts like 
Alastair Iain Johnston, those doctrine shifts have also led to an evolving concept of 
limited nuclear deterrence85, resting on a limited war-fighting capability and denying the 
adversary any victory in a nuclear war.86 Such a limited deterrence doctrine requires the 
development of a greater number of tactical, theater, and strategic nuclear weapons 
with improved accuracy to target nuclear forces in addition to cities. In the view of 
Chinese experts, however, China’s modernization program of its nuclear weaponry has 
rather ”limited aims” whilst Western experts exaggerate the importance and the 
influence of the ”limited deterrence” school in the PLA for the decision-making 
processes of the nuclear modernization programs.87 
China’s ambitious modernization programs of its nuclear forces, including of its IRBMs 
”to provide strategic dominance over East Asia” (Richard Fisher88), are another proof of 
the shifts because they seem mainly proactively doctrine-driven (a departure from the 
PLA’s past rather reactive practice). They demand changes in the PLA’s force structure, 
strategy and concepts of operation. Despite facing tremendous problems in modernizing 
its armed forces which is hampered by insufficient funds and the low level of its military 
technology base, numerous development programs of its nuclear forces are under way. 
In contrast to the United States and Russia, the modernization and expansion of 
                                            
84  See Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘China’s  New ‘Old Thinking’, here p.13f., and id., ‘Prospects for Chinese 
Nuclear Force Modernisation: Limited Deterrence versus Multilateral Arms Control’, The China 
Journal, June 1996, pp.548-576. 
85  Chinese strategists explicitly distinguish ”limited nuclear deterrence” from ”minimum deterrence”. In 
the first term, nuclear weapons play a much greater (counterforce-) warfighting role in the deterrence 
of both conventional and nuclear wars, particularly in the context of escalation control and intra-war 
deterrence - see Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘China’s  New ‘Old Thinking’, pp. 12 and 19 f. 
86  To the Chinese military doctrine shifts since 1985 see Paul H. B. Godwin, ‘From Continent to 
Periphery: PLA Doctrine, Strategy and Capabilities Towards 2000’, The China Quarterly, June 1996, 
pp. 464-487; Nan Li, ‘The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 1985-95: A 
Chinese Perspective’, ibid, pp. 443-463, Yao Yunzhu, ‘The Evolution of Military Doctrine of the 
Chinese PLA from 1985 to 1995’, The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 2/1995, pp. 57-80 and 
David Shambaugh, ‘The Insecurity of Security: The PLA’s Evolving Doctrine and Threat Perceptions 
Towards 2000’, The Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, No.1 (Spring) 1994, pp. 3-25. 
87  See Hongxun Hua, ‘China’s Strategic Missile Programs: Limited Aims, not ‘Limited Deterrence’’, The 
Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1998, pp. 60-68. 
88  Quoted following the article ‘China Upgrades Medium-Range Missiles Targeting East Asia’, ADJ 
8/1997, p. 63. 
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China’s nuclear and conventional armed forces had not been constrained by any 
international arms control regime until 1996. At the same time, uncertainty about these 
Chinese modernization programs and Beijing’s long-term strategic intentions behind 
those military programs under way arise primarily from the lack of transparency in its 
military sphere. The ultimate speed of the modernization of China’s nuclear forces 
remains thus unknown. 
Nonetheless, the focus on improving the qualitative level of China’s nuclear forces with 
the help of recruited former Soviet weapon scientists and engineers is directed toward a 
miniaturizing of warheads, better targeting accuracy, penetration and anti-electronic 
interference capability, modernizing its C2-networks, developing a MIRV capability as 
well as increasing the survivability and the camouflage of its nuclear forces such as 
storing them underground and deploying on mobile, land-based launchers or 
submarines.89 China has already build its first satellite ground station with military 
implications outside China on Kiribati’s main atoll Tarawa.90 The PLA navy is currently 
working on a new advanced nuclear submarine which will carry 12 SLBMs and will be 
deployed in the next decade.  
 
Table: Chinese Theater Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs/IRBMs/SLBMs: > 5,500km) 
Type/ 
Name 
Range 
(km) 
Payload 
(kg) 
Number CEP 
(m) 
Fuel Additional Comments 
DF-11/M-11 280-300 800-950 - 600 Solid Road-Mobile; HE or nuclear warhead 
DF-15/M-9 600 500 - 300 Solid Road-mobile; separating HE or  
 nuclear warhead 
DF-21 1,800 600 30-50 - Solid Road-mobile; 2-stage; HE or nuclear  
 Warhead; derived from JL-1 
DF-25 1,800 2,000 - - Solid Under development 
                                            
89  See also Yang Huan, ‘China Strategic Nuclear Weapons’, in: Michael Pillsbury (Ed.), ‘Chinese Views 
of Future Warfare’ (Washington D.C.: National Defence University Press, 1997), pp. 131-135, here p. 
134 f.; ‘China’s Slow March’, Carnegie Endowment-Non-Proliferation News and Resources (Internet: 
www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/analysis121200china.asp); Dunbar Lockwood, ‘The Status of U.S., 
Russian, and Chinese Nuclear Forces in Northeast Asia’, pp. 332 ff.; Holly Porteous, ‘China’s View of 
Strategic Weapons’, JIR, March 1996, pp. 134-136; in context see also Vipin Gupta, ‘Assessment of 
the Chinese Nuclear Test Site Near Lop Nor’, ibid., August 1993, pp. 378-381 and Yan Kong, 
‘China’s Nuclear Bureaucracy’, ibid., July 1993, pp. 320-326. 
90  See Bruce Gilley, ‘Pacific Outpost’, FEER, 30 April 1998, pp. 26-27 and JDW, 18 February 1998, p. 
17. 
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DF-3A 2,800 2,150 50-150 1.000 Liquid Transportable; 1-stage; HE or  
 Nuclear warhead 
DF-4  4,750 2,200 20 - Liquid Liquid/caves/rollout 
JL-1 1,700 600 12-24 - Solid 2-stage SLBM; nuclear warhead;  
deployed on one or two Xia SSBNs 
Sources: Wyn Bowen/Stanley Shepard, ‘Living under the Red Missile Threat’, JIR, December 1996, pp. 560-564, 
here p. 563, and ‘British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Forces’, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
November/December 1996, pp. 64-67, here p. 67. 
 
 
As part of the program, this new type of a nuclear submarine will be equipped with a 
new SLBM, called Jiulong-2 (CCS-NX-4), with a range of 8,000 km. It will allow Chinese 
submarines for the first time to target parts of the U.S. from areas located near the 
Chinese coast.91 Western experts anticipate that China will deploy 4-6 submarines, 
each armed with 12 SLBMs. That would add alone at least 48-72 warheads to China’s 
nuclear arsenal, with even more, if China can succeed with its MIRV development 
(expanding the number of warheads on the SLBMs at least two or three times).92 A new 
mobile, solid-fuel ICBM, named Dongfeng-31 (DF-31), had been tested by China at the 
end of May 1995 (few days after the indefinite extension of the NPT) and in August 
1999 as well as in November 2000.93 It also has a range of 8,000 km and can carry a 
payload of 200-300 Kt. The new ICBM is expected to be operable prior to the year 
2000.94 Another solid-fuel mobile ICBM (DF-41) under development will have a range of 
12,000 km and is anticipated to become operational not before 2010.95 Furthermore, 
China is also developing ground- and air-launched, land-attack cruise missiles, partly 
from versions of its turbojet powered C-802 anti-ship missile. Reportedly, this cruise 
missile with a range of at least 120 km, carrying a payload of 165kg, will incorporate a 
highly accurate Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance system and a terrain 
                                            
91  See also Nigel Holloway, ‘Touchy Issue. China Gets Defensive on Missile Reductions’, FEER, 23 
October 1997, p. 29 f. 
92  See Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernisation’, here p. 562 f. 
93  See Bill Gertz, The Washington Times, 12 December 2000 (online-version) and Washington Post, 13 
December 2000, p. A38 (online-version). 
94 See RIPS (Ed.), Asian Survey Security 1995-96 (London-Washington: Brassey's, 1996), here p.29f. 
and Paul H. B. Godwin, ‘Uncertainty, Insecurity and China’s Military Power’, Current History, 
September 1997, pp. 252-257, here p. 257. 
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contour-matching radar to improve the accuracy required to perform precision-strikes 
against high-value civilian and military targets such as command and control centers or 
government buildings in Taipei.96 This and other future cruise missiles with their low 
altitudes will present a major detection challenge for future TMD radar and effective 
counter measures. A report to the U.S. Congress has warned in 1997: ”A missile fleet of 
this size could overwhelm any theater missile defense capability planned for this vital 
region and fundamentally alter regional calculations of the balance of power.”97 
However, China presently still lacks an adequate limited nuclear war fighting posture 
with a satellite based early-warning (EW) capability and sufficient counter-force as well 
as counter-value tactical, theater and strategic nuclear forces to deter the escalation of 
conventional or nuclear war. But it is also clear that China is going to close this ”window 
of opportunity” — the gap between its operational requirements of the limited deterrence 
strategy and its nuclear doctrine assumptions — for its perceived potential adversaries. 
It is the result of the logical conclusion of China’s strategists that Beijing’s deterrent is 
uncertain or even frail and with that not credible enough. It leads already to a greater 
Chinese interest in launch-on-warning or launch-under-early attack postures and hence 
preemptive nuclear strategies98 that ultimately will undermine crisis stability.  
With those nuclear weapon programs under development and the ultimate goal of the 
Chinese political-military elite to narrow the technological gap to the United States and 
Russia and to create a less vulnerable, more flexible, and more reliable strategic 
retaliatory force, Beijing pushed through four nuclear tests (such as on 15 May and 17 
August 1995 as well as its last 44th and 45th tests on 8 June and on 29 July 1996) from 
1995 to 1996. China ignored thereby any international or regional repercussions before 
                                                                                                                                            
95 See John Wilson Lewis/Hua Di, 'China's Balllistic Missile Programs. Technologies, Strategies, Goals', 
International Security, Fall 1992, pp. 5-40, here p. 11. A new source claimed that the DF-41 
development has been cancelled, but it is expected that a new program will start, though has not 
been announced — see ‘China’s Slow March’, Carnegie Endowment. Other sources, however, 
believe that the DF-41 program is continuing. 
96  See Wyn Bowen/Stanley Shepard, ‘Living under the Red Missile Threat’, here p. 561 and John 
Downing, ‘China Develops Cruise Missiles’, Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter (A-PDR), August-
September 1997, p. 6. 
97  Quoted following the article by Barbara Starr, ‘China Could ‘Overwhelm’ Regional Missile Shield’, 
JDW, 23 April 1997, p. 16. 
98  See Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘China’s  New ‘Old Thinking’, here p. 21 f. 
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finally it pledged a moratorium as a pre-condition of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT).99  
Table : China’s Nuclear Arsenal vis-à-vis the Other Four Original Nuclear Weapon States 
Strategic Nuclear Weapons of the Original ”Nuclear Five” (1999) 
Country Suspected strategic 
nuclear weapons 
Suspected non-strategic 
nuclear weapons 
Suspected total nuclear 
weapons 
China   284   150     434 
France   482       0     482 
Russia 7,200 6,000-13,000 13,200-20,000 
UK    100   100     200 
USA 8,500 7,000 15,500 
Source: Ehsan Ahrari, ’China Eyes NATO’s Nuclear Doctrine’, in: Jane’s Intelligence Review (JIR), April 1999,    
p.  38 f., here p. 39. 
 
While the assumption that China will be able to close the gap between the nuclear 
doctrine and its operational requirements as well as capabilities over the next decade 
remains uncertain, China’s nuclear strength will nonetheless increase as the 
consequence of the international denuclearization between the nuclear superpowers 
United States and Russia. By implementing START-II, both arsenals will be downsized 
to 3-3,500 warheads. Consequently, the combined nuclear arsenal of both superpowers 
to Chinese strategic nuclear forces would fall from 70:1 to 7:1, or 3.5:1 compared with 
one of the nuclear superpowers (see the table above).100 Forthcoming START-III 
negotiations between the U.S. and Russian side will further reduce their arsenals to 
expected 1,500-2,000 nuclear warheads on each side or even more (in the case of 
Russia) until the end of 2007. A Chinese nuclear arsenal of some 600-900 warheads in 
the future would then automatically not only raise China’s global political prestige but 
also the scope of its regional nuclear and conventional military options in the Asia-
Pacific region (including towards the United States). Moreover, one has to take into 
account that China has in contrast to the United States no security commitments 
requiring a credible extended deterrence posture that justifies high numbers of 
                                            
99  See Tony Walker/Frances Williams, FT, 30 July 1996, p.1 and TKH, 30 July 1996, p. 1. 
100  See Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernisation: Limited Deterrence 
versus Multilateral Arms Control’, here p. 563. 
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warheads. However, it might help to explain another trend of China’s discussions of 
military doctrine — the increasing linkage between the PLA’s conventional and nuclear 
options.101 With a secure northern border towards Russia, China’s military strategy has 
now shifted its attention from the more general peripheral defense of the country to 
concrete maritime defense in order to guarantee militarily its officially claimed economic 
zones and territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea and increased military options 
toward Taiwan.102 Against this background, China’s increasing nuclear retaliatory 
capability might have primarily the function to prevent great power interference in local 
and limited conventional wars under high-tech conditions with small and medium 
powers such as those in the South China Sea. A credible nuclear deterrence option that 
guarantees nuclear escalation and its control similar to NATO’s ”flexible response” 
strategy of the 1980s requires thus both the qualitative modernization and quantitative 
increase of China’s nuclear arsenal vis-à-vis the United States and Russia. 
Although the most dramatic improvements of China’s armed forces are indeed taking 
place in its strategic and theater nuclear force modernization, its future capabilities 
might be constrained by China’s adherence to the CTBT, a fissile material cut-off, the 
possibility to deploy Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) or TMD systems in Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan and possible START-IV negotiations between all five nuclear powers.103 
Critical technological limitations such as computer capabilities for satellite-linked C3I or 
increasing the number, accuracy and survivability of delivery means might also 
constrain an unlimited modernization program of its nuclear forces. However, as 
analysis of China’s last military exercises and missile tests104 as well as revelations of 
exporting 46 powerful U.S. supercomputers to the Chinese Academy of Sciences105 
(which could be used for the testing of nuclear warheads) have shown, those technical 
constraints might not be the major barrier against the modernization programs for 
China’s nuclear armed forces. Relaxed U.S. export control for sensitive dual-use 
                                            
101  See also Nan Li, ‘The PLA’s Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics, 1985-95’, here p. 
460. 
102  See Paul H. B. Godwin, ‘From Continent to Periphery’, here p. 474. 
103  Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernisation: Limited Deterrence 
versus Multilateral Arms Control’, here pp. 564 ff. 
104  See Greg Gerardi/Richard Fisher Jr., ‘China’s Missile Tests Show More Muscle’, JIR, March 1997, 
pp. 125-129 and M.V. Rappai, ‘Chinese Military Exercises. A Study’, Strategic Analysis, November 
1996, pp. 1119-1131. 
105  See G. Milhollin, IHT, 1-2 March 1997, p.8., ibid., 13 June 1997, p.5 and J. Gerth/M. R. Gordon, ibid., 
28 October 1997, pp. 1 and 10. 
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technologies could indeed help China to build stealthier and longer range cruise and 
ballistic missiles with a much greater accuracy106 as the Cox-report has also 
confirmed.107 
Moreover, for the near future, all nuclear and missile development efforts are primarily 
directed to enhance China’s military capabilities in the event of future interventions by 
the U.S. Navy in the Taiwan Strait. Characteristically for the present most important 
military contingency planning as well as for the increasing influence of the PLA under 
Ziang Zemin in shaping Beijing’s foreign- and security policies is the selection of a 
Major-General Wang Zaixi as a deputy-director of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office which 
has not had a military officer among its top officials since 1990. Already in December 
1995, the Central Military Commission (CMC) as the highest political-military institution 
in China has set with the year 2010 a deadline for national reunification with Taiwan 
because China ”will definitely not tolerate the confrontational situation between the two 
sides after 2010.”108 In November 2000, Zhang Wannian, Vice-Chairman of the CMC 
(with his status next to President Jiang Zemin who heads the commission), argued that 
he is certain that in the next 5 years war would break out in the Taiwan Strait and that 
the PLA would be forced to initiate by striking first to paralyze Taiwan’s power 
installations and the combat ability of its fighter jets to guarantee military victory.109 
 
4.2 China’s Ambiguous Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Policies 
At the same time, these Chinese nuclear weapon programs, however, are not the only 
proliferation concerns of China's neighbors in North- and Southeast Asia as well as of 
the United States. China's weaponry and military technology export policy, too, dictated 
by the need to earn hard currency and to raise its political-military influence in the 
region, have caused uncertainty and instability in the region and particularly in its 
bilateral relation with the U.S.110 It also included the export of technology and delivery 
                                            
106  See also Nigel Holloway, ‘Cruise Control’, FEER, 14 August 1997, pp. 14-16. 
107  See Stephen Fidler, FT, 26 May 1999, p. 4. 
108  Quoted following Hua Di, ‘China’s Security Dilemma to the Year 2010’, CISAC/Stanford University 
1997, here p. 1. 
109  See ‘War in Taiwan Strait in Five Years’, AFP, 19 November 2000 (via Internet: 
taiwansecurity.org/AFP/AFP-111900-2.htm). 
110  See also Banning N. Garrett/Bonnie S. Glaser, ‘Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control’, 
International Security, No.3 (Winter) 1995/96, pp. 43-78 and Mitchel B. Wallerstein, ‘China and 
Proliferation: A Path Not Taken?’, Survival, No.3 (Autumn) 1996, pp. 58-66. 
 95 
means such as dual-use nuclear technology, missile technology as well as dual-use 
chemicals and chemical-production technologies to nuclear threshold countries such as 
Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and other potential nuclear proliferation states.  
It underscores the main question whether China is willing and able to function as an 
important player of the international community in order to stabilize and not to 
undermine regional and global security. China is hitherto not a member of the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in which 28 countries agreed not to export missiles 
capable of carrying a 500-kg warhead more than 300 km. Although the U.S. and China 
reached a quid-pro-quo compromise in October 1993, it called simultaneously for 
continued MTCR discussions and interpretations.111 It seemed also to continue 
transferring missile components and technology to countries like Pakistan and Iran.112 It 
seems also to highlight a fundamental shift from China’s traditional weapons and 
military related export policy to technology transfers, scientific assistance, production 
technologies, sub-components, and dual use transfers which are much more difficult to 
monitor than exports of complete weapon systems or plants. This shift, however, is not 
a special Chinese version of a weaponry export policy but rather a global non-
proliferation trend and challenge. Whether the new U.S.-China agreement of December 
1997 that was supposed to exclude any weapons and technology transfers for Iran’s 
missile and nuclear weapon programs would really change Beijing’s long-term 
weaponry and dual-use export policies remained uncertain due to internal and external 
developments during the transitional stage at that time.113 As the new non-proliferation 
agreement with the U.S of November 2000 (by promising not to assist countries in 
developing missiles with ranges of more than 300km that exceeds the limits established 
under the MTCR)114 has shown by itself, China has therewith indirectly confirmed that it 
                                            
111 China pointed out that the M-11 was specifically designed with an 800 kg payload and a range of 20 
km short of the MTCR restriction of 300 km. U.S. experts in contrast noted that a lower payload will 
enhance the range of the Chinese declared one and thus fall under the MCTR. The compromise 
stipulated that China will not export missiles with a range of 300 km and with a payload of at least 
500 kg - see Paul H. B. Godwin/John J. Schulz, 'China and Arms Control: Transition in East Asia', 
ACT, November 1994, pp. 7-11, here p. 11. 
112  See Douglas, Waller, ‘The Secret Missile Deal’, Time, 30 June 1997 and Thomas W. Lippman, The 
Washington Post, 23 May 1997, pp. A1 and A33. 
113  To the agreement see The Strait Times, 12 September 1997, p. 28 and Joseph Fitchett, IHT, 11 
December 1997, pp. 1 and 4. 
114  See also Jane Perlez, New York Times, 22 November 2000; Bryan Bender, ‘China Plege to Stop 
Missile Sales to Pakistan and Iran’, 29 November 2000; Mary Kwang, Strait Times, 24 November 
2000 and Jim Mann, IHT, 6 October 2000, p. 6. 
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did not live up to its formerly promised non-proliferation efforts. As U.S. intelligence 
sources have claimed last year, China has continued to supply materials and 
technologies for North Korea’s and Pakistan’s long-range ballistic missile programs.115 
Any progress of non-proliferation efforts by China has been made dependent on U.S. 
concessions in regard to its arms sales to Taiwan. In 1998, for instance, China has even 
refused to make any declarations of its arms imports and exports to the UN Arms 
Register as a protest against the inclusion of Taiwan in the annual publication. In the 
future, the new U.S.-China non-proliferation agreement could not only be undermined 
by the uncertain and unsolved Taiwan question but also by Beijing’s newly declared 
expansion of its arms exports in order to develop high-tech weaponry with the proceeds 
of overseas arms sales.116 
Another fact is even more important. While Beijing has also promised and underscored 
its willingness to implement a nation-wide effective export control system to prevent 
sales of sensitive proliferation-related technologies and end-products, no specific plan 
for action had been implemented until early 1997 in contrast to Taiwan. Then, however, 
China has taken new assurances, commitments and concrete steps which meet 
international standards: In May 1997, China’s State Council issued a new directive to all 
government agencies and non-governmental entities on the control of nuclear-related 
exports to prevent covered exchanges of technical personnel and information; one 
month later, it published an interim list of nuclear-related dual-use technologies identical 
to the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s dual-use list; in September 1997, the State Council 
established new nuclear export control regulations identical to the list used by the 
Nuclear Supplier Group; finally, in October 1997, China became a member of the NPT 
Exporters Committee (Zangger Committee). This was the first time that China has 
joined a multilateral non-proliferation export control regime. These various steps 
constitute a positive shift in China’s nuclear non-proliferation policies and practices.117 
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However, they might conflict with other strategic foreign and national security interests 
of China. During Jiang Zemin’s South-East-Asian visits in India, Pakistan and Nepal at 
the end of 1996, he confirmed, for instance, to maintain its cooperation with Pakistan 
concerning the ”civilian use of nuclear energy”.118 Thus far, China has remained neither 
a ”team player” nor a ”rogue elephant”.119  
In order to promote transparency, security and stability in East Asia, the Chinese 
willingness to cooperate is an essential prerequisite for new arms control negotiations 
and the success of treaties and regimes such as a global fissile material production cut-
off convention.120 Similar as in the case of the CTBT, an Indian signature is dependent 
on China and a Pakistani ratification on India’s. Thus far, Chinese strategists seem not 
very concerned about future regional proliferants around its borders.121 Therefore, 
China stands at the cross-roads in its non-proliferation policy that might become a 
litmus test of its future role in regional and global affairs with direct implications of 
foreign policies towards Beijing. A continued Chinese nuclear and missile technology 
cooperation with Pakistan, for instance, might further backfire and finally be 
counterproductive for Beijing’s own security some day in the not-too-distant future as 
the five Indian nuclear tests in May 1999 and New Delhi’s justification as a 
counterbalance to China’s nuclear arsenal (and not Pakistan’s) have already 
demonstrated. 
Moreover, whereas other East Asian states are cutting their defense budgets, China’s 
defense budget in 1998 and 1999 enjoyed a 10th and a 11th year of double-digit growth, 
compounded by significant cuts in troop strength that were announced in 1997. The 
defense budget of 1998 increased again by 12.9 per cent to US-$10.99 billion in 1998-
99 (15.8 percent in overall spending). The 1999 increase in China´s official defense 
budget by 12.7 percent to 120.5 billion Yuan (almost $15 billion) — for a huge real 
defense budget of more than $40 billion (more than the individual defense budgets of 
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Great Britain, France or Germany), according to the latest Military Balance of the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies — plus the last year‘s enlarged gap between 
double-digit military spending increases and overall growth of the gross domestic 
product of only 7.1 percent in 1999, have all heightened the sense of latent threat 
among China´s neighbors. Immediately after the bombing of the embassy in Belgrade, 
the Politburo under Jiang Zemin approved apparently additional expenditure on 
defense. According to a Hong Kong publication, an additional 20 billion Yuan ($2.5 
billion) from the current 1999 budget for large-scale infrastructure programs, has been 
reallocated to defense projects. This sum has then been raised to a total of 100 billion 
Yuan ($12.5 billion) by 2003. In addition, the Council of State is said to have approved, 
in summer of 1999, a further 80 billion Yuan ($10 billion) for the acquisition of new 
weapons systems. If these figures are accurate, then the defense budget for 1999 was 
215.2 billion Yuan ($27 billion), almost twice as high as the official estimates.122 Given 
China’s new White Paper of ”National Defense in 2000”123 — which is not just a PLA 
document but an assessment fully coordinated among the party, PLA and other 
government ministries and organizations —, the much more negative perception of the 
U.S. will translate in further military spending to improve the country’s military 
capabilities to defend itself. But it will also create a more heavy burden for the economic 
foundation of China’s economic and political transformation. 
The development of the nuclear-weapons arsenal therefore also has high relevance to 
the security of China´s smaller neighbors. The People´s Republic seems less interested 
in creating a true military balance than in building up effective military deterrent 
capabilities against the United States, in order to increase sharply the US vulnerability 
and thus raise the threshold of American intervention through a scenario of ”asymmetric 
warfare.” Against this background of antagonistic security perceptions and concepts, the 
security dilemmas in East Asia could be further aggravated. 
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4.3 China’s Objections Against TMD-Programs of its Asian Neighbors124 
In the view of China, an effective TMD-option of the United States and its allies Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan against China’s nuclear ballistic missiles would not only 
question its nuclear deterrence against those potential aggressors but also dramatically 
increase the U.S. ability to launch a disarming first strike against China. Consequently, 
China is — like Russia — essentially interested on the endorsement of the principles 
behind the ABM-treaty.125  
Since the first discussions of a TMD-option for Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, Beijing 
has been alarmed and protested strongfully against such capabilities which would 
cause ”a new arms race in Northeast Asia”. The USA aims to have reliable TMD 
systems not later than 2007. Benjamin A. Gilman, chairman of the U.S. House of 
Representatives International Relations Committee, has called for the creation of a 
regional-wide Northeast Asia Defence Organisation (NADO) to combine U.S. efforts 
with those of its East Asian allies to develop an effective TMD-system.126 Beijing’s 
objections are not only directed against a TMD-option of Japan but also of South Korea 
and in particular against a joint TMD-capability involving Taiwan because it might 
undermine Beijing’s missile assertive policies towards Taipeh. In the view of Beijing, a 
Taiwanese TMD-capability might strengthen the pro-independence forces on the island 
to declare the country as an independent nation. U.S. officials have already confirmed 
that the U.S. has provided Taiwan with TMD information and has sold several Patriot 
anti-missile batteries which are the most advanced anti-missile systems in the region. 
The Clinton government has also considered to sell four Aegis-class air-defence 
destroyers to Taiwan (after it has already approved in principle an expensive early 
warning radar in the spring of 1999) which would significantly enhance Taiwan’s anti-
missile capabilities. But for the time being, it will not sell those destroyers. It has linked 
such a delivery with China’s future arms build-up. Furthermore, the Pentagon has 
quietly and secretly expanded its military ties and cooperation programs with the 
Taiwanese armed forces since the missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-96.127 In 
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the view of China, US arms exports to Tawan are viewed as a matter of proliferation 
concern. In their bilateral discussions with the U.S., Beijing has repeatedly sought to link 
U.S. arms exports to Taiwan to U.S. concerns of Chinese arms sales to countries such 
as Pakistan and Iran — an attempt which the Clinton government resisted to accept.128 
Meanwhile, the PR China government has made clear towards Washington that a 
continual delivery of U.S. military equipment to Taiwan that could enhance its missile 
defense capabilities would be considered as a hostile act and could ultimately be ”the 
last straw” in the U.S.-Chinese relations.129 Taiwan itself has in August 1998 tested 
successfully a converted version of the island’s locally developed Sky Bow-II anti-
aircraft missile in an anti-ballistic missile test whilst Washington has declared in January 
1999 to spend an additional $6.6 billion to develop a NMD system. Furthermore, Taiwan 
has announced to spend $600 million to indigenous missile programs during the next 
fiscal year. Fearing to upset China and to cause unwanted friction in the bilateral 
relationship, the Clinton government (in contrast to the mood in the U.S. Congress), 
however, seems presently rather unwilling to provide Taiwan with TMD systems in the 
foreseeable future and tries therefore to play on time.130 That however, creates 
numerous security challenges for Taiwan, particularly if China should indeed have 
obtained secret US nuclear information for possible use with its own missile program 
(such as the miniaturization of nuclear warheads).131 Following massive U.S. pressure 
in the 1980s, Taiwan has given up a nuclear weapons program as an effective 
deterrence option against Beijing. However, it is considering to develop its own 
counterforce short-range ballistic missile force (by restarting the ”TienMa” program with 
a range of 1,000km which had been stopped in 1996 following political pressure by 
Washington) that will cover much the adjacent coastal region of the PR China with a no 
first-use doctrine. PR China itself is in the process of increasing its nuclear arsenal in 
numbers and in quality. Presently, for instance, it is in the process to deploy an 
advanced, longer-range version of the DF-21, provisionally called DF-21X, with an 
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extended range of 3,000km and an improved accuracy.132 Moreover, Beijing has 
launched up to six satellites last year which will improve the accuracy of its ballistic 
missiles and will allow detailed reconnaissance of Taiwan’s defense capabilities. At the 
same time, the PLA has made considerable progress in developing manoeuvrable 
short-range ballistic missiles with ranges between 300-600km and is developing a new 
generation of land attack cruise missiles to target accurately key Taiwanese military 
installations by using newly acquired dual-use technologies such as the GPS and the 
inertial navigation guidance system (INS).133 Meanwhile, most of its deployed 200-
250M-11 (range 300km) and M-9 (range 600km) short-range ballistic missiles (in 
contrast to 30-50 SRBMs in 1995-96) in provinces adjacent to the 175-km-wide Taiwan 
Strait have already an improved accuracy estimated to 20-30 metres by using GPS and 
INS minicomputers. The deployment of those missiles is at least partially the result of 
the fact that the PLA still regards the controversial missile tests of 1995 and 1996 — in 
contrast to China’s Foreign Ministry and other civilian ministries — as a victory.134 In few 
years, this Chinese missile build-up might — it plans to raise the number to around 650 
in the next years with a present deployment of 50 new missiles a year135 — shift the 
balance of deterrence in favor of mainland China which can result in new and more risk-
taking policies on Beijing’s side. In response to this missile threat, Taiwan will deploy 
three batteries with 200 Patriot missiles in northern Taiwan to protect the capital city and 
economic center albeit they will be incapable to shoot own 100 percent of incoming 
missiles.136 
In the view of the PR China, the U.S. is exaggerating the military threat of missile 
attacks from North Korea (not to speak about China’s nuclear missile force) and using it 
as a pretext to strengthen its military alliance and enhancing the military presence in 
East Asia in order to contain China.137 Moreover, an effective TMD-option of the U.S. 
and its main allies in East Asia against China’s nuclear missiles would not only question 
its nuclear deterrence against potential aggressors but also dramatically increase U.S. 
capabilities to launch a disarming strike against China. Furthermore, if Japan would 
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prefer a naval TMD-option, based, inter alia, on its Aegis-class destroyers, then even 
Taiwan might benefit from such a naval-based TMD umbrella. This might further 
hamper Beijing’s reunification with Taiwan. 
Instead of an TMD-option, Beijing has proposed to transform the bilateral 1972 ABM-
Treaty between the U.S. and the Soviet Union into a multinational treaty.138 But whilst 
the U.S. seems to be reluctant to develop jointly TMD capabilities with Taiwan, it has 
actively demanded from Japan and South Korea to join the TMD-research projects. As 
Pentagon officials have indicated the U.S. must ensure in jointly developing TMD-
capabilities with Japan and South Korea not to transfer such technologies to Taiwan.139  
Although Beijing’s objections against TMD-systems in its three neighboring countries 
are to some extent understandable, most of China’s argumentation is not very 
convincing and persuasive if it is analyzed in detail: 
• Besides Russia, China is the only regional great power which possesses nuclear 
weapons in East Asia. With the retrenchment of Soviet/Russian military power from 
its frontiers in the aftermath of the Cold War, China is now enjoying an 
unprecedented strategic latitude in the region. Moreover, it is currently the only 
nuclear power in the world which is steadily enhancing the numbers as well as the 
quality of its nuclear arsenal whereas all the other nuclear powers have downsized 
their nuclear arsenals since the beginning of the 1990s. Against this background, to 
transform the bilateral ABM-treaty into a multilateral one would only stabilize the 
formal status quo in the region: China as an expanding  nuclear armed weapon state 
with Japan and South Korea as non-nuclear weapons powers in its proximity. Japan 
and South Korea, without the acquisition of an effective defense shield against 
ballistic missiles, would be thus confronted with an increasing modernization and 
expansion of China’s nuclear missile arsenal in the future. Ultimately, they would 
have no effective capabilities to defend their country against the newly emerging 
missile threat. 
• Against this background, Japan and South Korea can only rely upon the U.S. 
extended nuclear deterrence umbrella which, however, has lost some of its former 
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credibility in the new multipolar post-Cold War security environment. Nonetheless, as 
long as the U.S.-Japanese security alliance with its dual functions - constraining as 
well as protecting Japan — is maintained, the ”nuclear problem” is solved and a 
”nuclearization” of Japan’s defense policies remains only a theoretical option on the 
future horizon. If the security alliance will collapse, however, Japan would be 
surrounded by nuclear and potentially hostile neighbors (including a united, perhaps 
nuclear Korea). As Robyn Lim has argued: ”While Japan may lack strategic ambition, 
it does not lack strategic anxieties. Any breakdown of the US-Japanese alliance 
would oblige Japan to look to its own security, and nuclear weapons are the 
‘isolationist dream’.”140  
• In the case that Japan feels, indeed, insecure and isolated, it might not only be 
tempted to renounce its former non-nuclear weapon status, but also to acquire long-
range offensive maritime strike warfare capabilities as a deterrence option and the 
only military alternative to TMD-systems as it is seriously considered by South Korea 
and Taiwan. Those conventional offensive precision strike-warfare capabilities (like in 
the Gulf-War) intended to destroy the missile launchers, storage bases, logistic sites, 
road or rail transport systems and command, control, communication, and 
information centers (C3I), however, might undermine regional stability and deepen 
the regional security dilemmas even more. A Japan without an effective anti-missile 
defense shield in a potential hostile security environment has thus similar security 
implications. The only defense alternative for a Japanese TMD-option would be 
drastically enhanced conventional capabilities, including offensive, long-range 
maritime naval and air force conventional capabilities, being able to destroy nuclear 
weapons with preemptive or even preventive strikes. Those conventional offensive 
counter-force postures, however, would be much more destabilizing for the entire 
region as well as much more dangerous for China itself. In this light, China should be 
much more concerned about a security environment without TMD capabilities 
because of the ”near-certainty of war”, particularly in an escalating crisis.141 
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• Against this background, China ultimately denies Japan to acquire a legitimate 
defense capability against a potential ballistic missile threat. What China demands is 
ultimately thus nothing else than total security for itself — which means 
simultaneously total insecurity and vulnerability for Japan and the rest of East Asia. 
That, however, is neither realistic nor desirable for the future stability of the region. 
• Moreover, China’s missile firing diplomacy in 1995 and 1996 — which was the first 
time that a nuclear power used its missile arsenal for psychological warfare and terror 
in peacetime — contradicts its own no-first-use pledge and negative security 
assurances. While Beijing seems in this regard to have moved from an unconditional 
to a conditional no-first-use posture in 1995 which seems to have excluded not only 
India, Pakistan and Israel, but also Taiwan142, China‘s policy towards Japan is similar 
ambiguous: it claims never to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state, but 
simultaneously maintains the argumentation that TMD capabilities in Japan would 
erode the credibility of China’s nuclear forces.143 Therewith China has indirectly 
confirmed that Japan is targeted by China’s nuclear missiles. But as long as Japan 
does not acquire long-range missile forces and other offensive weapons capabilities 
and as long as China is maintaining its current military strategy of ”minimum 
deterrence”, a modest Japanese TMD capability would neither in size nor technically 
undermine the credibility and effectiveness of China’s nuclear posture. But if China 
chooses to adopt a ”limited nuclear strategy” in contrast to ”minimum deterrence” (in 
the Chinese, both approaches are not the same), it would require a stronger and 
more flexible nuclear capability to strike targets not only in the adversary’s homeland, 
but also on the battlefield and the theater. Given the fact that China seems indeed to 
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move in this direction, its objectives and diplomatic protests against any TMD-option 
become much more understandable from a military strategic point of view.  
• Such a military defense posture serves in the Chinese view primarily the objective to 
achieve specific political aims. Accordingly, the expansion of its nuclear and 
conventional capabilities serves China’s historic ambitions and grievances to raise 
again as the ”Middle Kingdom”. It enables Beijing to exert leverage directly or 
indirectly over Japan’s political and military decision-making in peacetime as well as 
in crisis or during violent regional military conflicts.144 
• It is also necessary to bear in mind that even in the case that with or without TMD-
capabilities of its East Asian neighbors, Beijing’s strategic and theater nuclear force 
modernization and numerical expansion will nonetheless continue as its budget 
permits because of global military-strategic objectives (vis-à-vis the U.S.) and internal 
bureaucratic factors as Chinese experts admit privately.145  
In general, a military-political modus vivendi seems — at least theoretically — not 
excluded per se between China and its neighbors as well as with the U.S. (also in 
regard to NMD option of the U.S.). But as long as there is no serious strategic dialogue 
between Washington and Beijing as well as between China and its East Asian 
neighbors taking place, such a modus vivendi will be extremely difficult to achieve in the 
forthcoming years. 
 
5. Korea: Giving Up its Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Ambitions? 
5.1 The Crisis on the Korean Peninsula 
North Korea’s nuclear and missile blackmail strategies — including refusing to give 
international inspectors full access to its nuclear sites, its ongoing missile and 
technology exports to Pakistan and Iran, its own unexpected missile launch of the 
Taep’o-dong-I on 31 August 1998 and revelations of vast underground facilities under 
construction — have led to calls for a major re-evaluation of the US policy towards 
North Korea. Hereby, North Korea’s blackmail policies have not only threatened the 
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October 1994 Agreed Framework and therewith the KEDO-process to freeze its nuclear 
plutonium program but also the engagement policies of the U.S. and the international 
community. Furthermore, the DPRK is believed to have produced sufficient plutonium to 
construct 2-6 nuclear bombs. 
The Geneva Agreed Framework of October 1994 only stopped the production of 
plutonium at the Yongbyon Atomic Energy Research Center. Whether therewith it has 
really halted or severely curtailed North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, became 
more and more questionable. Furthermore, the Agreed Framework cannot stop North 
Korea’s ballistic missile programs.  
In the U.S. perception it became clear until 1998 that its engagement policy did not 
modify North Korea’s overall behavior. The Agreed Framework failed so far to open 
North Korea’s society for the outside world and to constrain North Korea’s ruthless 
behavior. In the view of its critics, it has only provided a framework for moving from one 
crisis to the next one without seeing any light at the end of the tunnel. Indeed, these 
frequent, chronic crisis have weakened the agreement’s credibility and support, 
particularly in the U.S. Congress. The so-called ”benign neglect option” has gained 
increasing support which calls to cut off its few contacts with North Korea, keep all 
sanctions in place, and focus on maximizing U.S. deterrence capabilities. But if 
implemented, it would also undermine South Korea’s ”sunshine policy” vis-à-vis its 
northern brother and therewith risk a deterioration of the U.S.-South Korean security 
alliance. Although the Clinton government was maintaining its engagement policy vis-à-
vis North Korea, it has modified its policy in 1998 if its package of economic (including 
easing U.S. trade sanctions, providing food and development aid) and political benefits 
to curb the DPRK’s missile and nuclear programs would fail. Then it would have 
adopted a second track approach which would include to adopt harsher containment 
measures, possibly including a military naval blockade of the North. 
Given the fact that North Korea sees its missile capability as its last trump card as part 
of a strategy of drawing Washington into a negotiation over withdrawing U.S. troops 
from South Korea, the future prospects of the Agreed Framework seemed rather poor 
until 1999. Against this background, more and more U.S. experts and politicians have 
demanded a fundamental diplomatic restructuring which shall include a counter-
diplomatic agenda on ICBM and troop issues in a broader context of arms control 
measures in the Korean peninsula. What has been lacking in the U.S. policies towards 
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North Korea is a comprehensive, long-term strategy that creates a common framework 
for the Agreed Framework/KEDO issues, the US-DPRK missile talks, and other 
initiatives.  
Hence, North Korea seems rather unwilling and unable to bargain away its only trump 
card it still has in its hands: its ballistic missiles. Ultimately, they cannot be divorced 
from the ultimate goal of sustaining the North Korean system as well as the political 
regime. In this regard, the US and western strategy of a ”comprehensive engagement” 
can hardly succeed. Even under the best circumstances, diplomacy with North Korea 
will remain be tense and frustrating. On the other hand, there is no other viable political 
alternative if one seeks to avoid a return to disastrous preemptive military options the 
US was considering in 1994 to stop North Korea’s nuclear program. The implementation 
of the Agreed Framework remains the best approach to preventing nuclear weapons 
development in North Korea. At the same time, North Korea is increasingly dependent 
on outside support to sustain itself which provides at least more incentives for a greater 
dialogue. Nonetheless, a second Taepo-Dong missile launch would have threatened all 
existing engagement efforts with North Korea. It was seen as a litmus test for 
Pyongyang‘s intentions to cooperate or to confront the outside world.  
North Korea’s recent interest in economics and business has been underscored by an 
increase in late 1998 and early 1999 in the numbers of DPRK diplomats posted 
overseas, particularly to Europe after a 30 percent reduction witnessed throughout 
1998. It remains to be seen whether Pyongyang’s new diplomatic activism (Italy was the 
first G-7 member to establish diplomatic relations in January 2000, followed by Spain, 
Great Britain and the Netherlands) will have lasting positive implications for security in 
North East Asia. Pyongyang’s main interest is in foreign aid and investment, but the 
above mentioned activities could also reflect a steady increase in self-confidence within 
the North Korean regime as the country’s protracted famine shows signs of some 
easing.146 Moreover, bilateral trade with South Korea reached a record US$330 million 
in 1999, up from US$220 million in 1998.147 At the same time, inter-Korean social, 
cultural, and personnel exchanges have increased remarkably. By the end of 1999, 581 
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South Korean companies were already doing business in North Korea, and more than 
20,000 South Koreans had visited the North since February 1998.  
As of today, any breakthrough in the inter-Korean dialogue has been prevented by 
North Korea’s insistence on certain conditions, such as the withdrawal of US troops 
from the Korean peninsula and an end of joint military cooperation among South Korea, 
the US, and Japan. Nevertheless, Pyongyang warmed up to the idea of high-level inter-
Korean talks. Ultimately, however, the DPRK leadership will pursue various strategies to 
assure the interim survival of the political regime and will shift back and forth among 
them as it sees fit. Therefore, and recent positive trends on the Korean peninsula 
notwithstanding, North Korea’s gradual inclusion into the international community is by 
no means assured, and the issue requires a constant and coherent international crisis 
management and multilateral engagement. 
 
5.2 The October 1994 Agreed Framework and KEDO: A Sufficient Diplomatic   
      Instrument for Solving All Security Problems on the Korean Peninsula? 
The accord provides, among other things, for the establishment of a multinational 
consortium that will finance and supply North Korea with two light water reactors 
(LWRs) by the target 2003. In return, North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear program 
immediately, pledged not to refuel its Yongbyon reactor, undertook to halt construction 
of another reactor at that site and of another one at Taechon, and agreed to seal the 
Yonbyon plutonium separation plant and the fabrication plant at the site, and to leave 
the spent fuel discharged from the smaller reactor in June 1994 in storage, without 
plutonium separation. To offset the energy deficit that North Korea claimed it would face 
by the freezing of its reactors and related facilities, the US was to arrange for the 
delivery to North Korea of heavy oil for heating and electricity production ”that will reach 
a rate of 500,000 tons annually”. This grant of heavy oil would stop with the completion 
of the first LWR. 
Furthermore, the Agreed Framework also provides steps toward the normalization of 
relations between Pyongyang and Washington, US assurances against the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons against the North, and a North Korean commitment to 
implement the ”1992 North-South Declaration on the De-Nuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula.” For the first time, North Korea also agreed to IAEA inspection of the two 
undeclared waste sites, which can help to reveal the history of past plutonium 
production.  
As a byproduct of the agreement, the construction of the LWRs would require 
thousands of South Korean engineers, technicians, and laborers to work, live, and 
socialize in the North for a decade, thereby improving the chances for more normal 
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relations between Pyongyang and Seoul and lifting, at least partially, the veil of secrecy 
surrounding the North. In his light and the fact that KEDO can be seen as the first 
multilateral security institution (albeit for specific purposes), the Framework is seen as 
the centerpiece of a broader diplomatic effort made by the US and the international 
community to integrate the DPRK into the world community and restrain its ”rogue” 
behavior through systematic multilateral engagement.  
Thus far, Pyongyang continues to observe the October 1994 Agreed Framework and a 
moratorium on missile launches as it negotiates with the US, South Korea and Japan. 
At the same time, however, North Korea has been continuing with missile development 
short of test launches (indeed, it has only suspended testing of long-range ballistic 
missiles), and is continuing to selling missiles as well as missile technology to 
customers around the globe. In the absence of comprehensive inspection procedures, 
other countries cannot be confident that North Korea has really stopped working on the 
development of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Its missiles are capable of 
striking Japan and the US and inflicting even greater damage on South Korea. Their 
development has security implications for South Asia and even for Europe. 
 
5.3 A Balanced Assessment of the Agreed Framework: The Failing Effective and  
      Comprehensive Inspection Regime 
However, according to the accord, the inspection of the two undeclared sites has been 
postponed for an extended period (four to six years), creating a special safeguard status 
for North Korea. The inspection problems for verification of North Korea’s past weapons 
program and an indication for ongoing research of nuclear weaponry have never been 
solved effectively. The IAEA has been allowed to conduct routine and ad hoc inspection 
of ”unfrozen” nuclear facilities but not of the reprocessing plant, and it has been allowed 
merely, for instance, to measure but not to analyze the spent fuel. Furthermore, many 
suspicious underground facilities are not inspected because of a failing comprehensive 
and effective inspection regime (see also the example of Iraq). Hence, a considerable 
part of North Korea’s previous nuclear weapon program and many nuclear facilities 
remain unmonitored. According to IAEA inspectors the information and access provided 
by Pyongyang so far have been insufficient to build a complete picture of the North 
Korean nuclear weapons program. 
Therefore, other countries and many foreign experts (particularly in the US Congress) 
remain suspicious whether North Korea has really stopped working not only on the 
development of nuclear but also biological and chemical weapons (the latter are not 
covered by the Agreed Framework; North Korea is a party to the Biological Wweapons 
Convention/BWC, but not to the Chemical Weapons Convention/CWC). In this light, the 
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Kumchang-ri inspection is an example: Although the May 1999 Kumchang-ri148 
inspection by fifteen US experts under the direction of former secretary of defense Dr. 
William Perry did not produce evidence for the previous or intended production of 
weapons-grade plutonium or reprocessing activities149, the inspection report concluded 
that the site could support the respective facilities in the future if substantially modified. 
Therefore, a follow-up visit to Kumchang-ri in May 2000 could also not provide any 
definite conclusions. Arguably, after more than six months passed since the first 
suspicions over the site had emerged, North Korea had enough time to clear that facility 
and to move its suspected nuclear weapons program to another underground facility 
which is not covered by the agreement. 
 
5.4 A Missile Deal Emerging? – Perspectives 
The sensational message of the new Russian President Vladimir Putin in July 2000 that 
North Korea is now willing to abandon its ballistic missile program and exports in return 
for ”civilian” space technology and the willingness of other states to launch at least two 
North Korean space satellites a year offered new hopes to finalize an agreement to curb 
North Korea’s missile exports.150 Already back in 1998, Pyongyang has shown some 
willingness to trade its missiles for a price. Shortly after its missile test in August 1998, 
North Korea announced to be ready to export the Taepo-dong-I missile by the year 
2000 at a cost of $6 million each.151 Simultaneously, it demanded $500 million from 
Washington in compensation for stopping missile exports to the Middle East.152 On 16 
June 1998, it seemed even willing to negotiate an end to its missile tests and 
deployments. Such a verifiable end to North Korea’s missile tests and deployment 
would indeed enhance Japan’s security, stabilize the KEDO-process and contribute to 
global non-proliferation efforts to curb missile and related technologies transfers. 
While the new North Korean offer made towards the Russian President seemed to give 
Russia a considerable amount of leverage vis-à-vis Washington’s missile defense plans 
and the revision of the ABM-treaty, North Korea’s offer was dubious in many ways from 
                                            
148  On Kumchang-ri and other nuclear facilities in North Korea see in particular Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., 
”Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure – Part One,” JIR, July 1999, pp. 36-41; ”Part 
Two,” ibid., August 1999. 
149 The team was permitted to measure all underground areas and to take soil and water samples. 
150  See Michael R. Gordon, IHT, 20 July 2000, pp. 1 and 4. 
151  See Don Kirk, IHT, 3 September 1998, p.4. 
152  See TKH, 3 September 1998, p.3. 
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the very beginning. Pyongyang cannot really expect that other countries would provide it 
with advanced missiles it could easily copy and use it for its own secret military missile 
programs. Furthermore, the question is still unanswered by Russia and North Korea for 
which purposes North Korea really needs any space satellites in the light of its severe 
economic and food crisis. But in a new meeting in August 2000, Kim Jong-Il already 
retreated from his offer made to Putin. He is reported to have stated that he did not 
intend to make a serious proposal to Putin but brought the idea up in a ”passing, 
laughable matter”. As other remarks by the North Korea’s leader suggest he has had 
some second thoughts about his proposal to Putin. In addition, the diplomatic slap and 
insulting to Putin has substantially decreased Russia’s intended future bargaining 
position of its reengagement policy in East Asia it received during the first half of the 
year 2000.153 But it also highlights the future unpredictability of Kim Jong-Il for Russia 
and the rest of the world. Whether Pyongyang sees its missiles as a card to play in a 
bargaining deal or as an issue that is not traded, remains to be seen. 
 
5.5 TMD as a Bargaining Chip for South Korea and the U.S.? 
From a U.S. point of view, North Korea was not the only ”rogue state”, whereas China is 
seen as the major future potential threat to U.S. interests in the region and beyond. 
From a South Korean point of view, Seoul –— in contrast to Japan and Taiwan -— has 
ruled out any participation in the proposed TMD program for the time being. It is 
explained due to the huge costs for a country that had significantly to reduce its defense 
budget as the result of the financial crisis as well as due to the specific designs of the 
TMD program because its main threat stems from North Korea’s short-range Scud 
missiles and artillery massed just 50km from Seoul. Those short-range missiles, 
however, cannot effectively be countered by the TMD system which is aimed at 
detecting and intercepting primarily medium- and long-range missiles (as it looks now). 
Instead of it, Seoul is developing its own anti-ballistic systems, acquiring Patriot or the 
Russian S-300V Grumble SAMs and developing own offensive surface-to-surface 
ballistic missiles (‘Hyonmu’). However, the limits of the 1979 memorandum of 
understanding on technology sharing between the US and South Korea restricts Seoul 
from testing missiles with a range of more than 180km. Its new missile which had been 
                                            
153 See F.Umbach, ‘Russia’s Strategic and Military Interests in North and South East Asia’, here p. 296.  
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tested on April 10, 1999, however, might already have a range of 300km. While Seoul is 
interested to boost the missile performance to more than 500km (actually it needs a 
ballistic missile to 800-1,000km to target military bases along North Korea’s border with 
China), the US seemed unwilling to provide the technological assistance unless Seoul 
agrees to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which restricts the 
maximum range to 500km and aims to prevent exports of key technology of ballistic 
missiles to other states. Finally, after extended controversial 20 rounds negotiations 
since 1995, both sides reached a compromise in October 2000 in the form of a policy 
declaration, allowing South Korea to produce and deploy missiles with a range of 
300km range and a 500kg warhead as well as to develop missiles with a range of up to 
500km for research purposes.154 But even the 300km range gives South Korea the 
capability to strike Pyongyang and other key North Korean cities. South Korea’s military 
establishment believes that such a counter ballistic missile and deterrence force would 
be much more effective than a costly and ineffective TMD. But such a long-range 
missile buildup might not only threaten its global and regional MTCR and non-
proliferation policies, but perhaps also incite a new arms race in an already complex 
military-strategic environment in Northeast Asia and, furthermore, undermine crisis 
stability and conflict management by creating additional incentives for preemptive 
military strike options on both sides of the Korean peninsula. However, it might be a 
bargaining chip vis-à-vis North Korea’s ballistic missile development, tests and exports.  
 
6.  Conclusions and Perspectives: Implications for Japan’s Security Policies in 
the 21st Century 
While North Korea’s missile exports and transfer of missile technology seemed not to 
have direct security implications for Japan, its missile test of August 1998 fundamentally 
changed Japan’s short-term security perceptions and defense policies. After long and 
controversial discussions of the huge costs (according to some estimates over $15 
billion for Japan’s commitment) and constitutional constraints as well as preliminary 
studies, Tokyo agreed with the U.S. to conduct joint research on a theater missile 
defense system that could protect the island nation from ballistic missile attack and 
strengthening its bilateral alliance. In November 1998, Japan’s government approved 
                                            
154  See Shin Yong-bae, The Korea Herald, 18 October 2000. 
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the plan to launch four reconnaissance satellites by the spring of 2003 after considering 
such a capability for nearly a decade albeit it still requires legislative ratification in the 
Diet. Finally in August 1999, the U.S. and Japan formalized am agreement to conduct 
joint technology research on TMD.  
Regardless the question, whether the missile carried a satellite or not, the missile test 
demonstrated that Japan is within range of North Korea’s ballistic missiles. Furthermore, 
it indicated that after the United States, Russia and China in the era of the Cold War, 
North Korea has now acquired the advanced technology to become the fourth country 
with an operational land-based, intercontinental ballistic missile capability in few years. 
North Korea has obviously made considerable progress in mastering technical 
obstacles of multi-staged long-range ballistic missiles whose range and capability 
caused surprise even in U.S. intelligence circles. Until that time, North Korea’s ballistic 
missiles were not expected to reach the 4,000km to 6,000km range until 2002-2004. It 
signaled to both the U.S. and Japan that it has now the capability to strike at US military 
facilities at least in Japan and on Okinawa. It is even possible that US bases in Guam 
and Hawaii will eventually come within North Korea’s missile range in some years.  
Reportedly, the technological progress of North Korea’s ballistic missile systems has 
apparently made with the external assistance of engineers, designers and other 
scientists from Russia and Ukraine.155 Although those reports are hardly to verify, up to 
2,000 Russian scientists and engineers are believed to work in North Korea to develop 
missile and other weapons projects. In July 1998, the findings of the Commission to 
Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, chaired by the former and new 
Defense Secretary of the Bush-Administration, Donald Rumsfeld, and delivered to the 
U.S. Congress, already concluded that ballistic missile threats are evolving more rapidly 
than previously estimated by the U.S. intelligence community. The ‘Rumsfeld-report’ 
also explained the reduced warning time for the U.S. and its allies by paying also more 
attention to external technical assistance from Russia and China, including from hired 
scientists and engineers, involved in missile programs of North Korea, Iran and other 
states in the Middle East. Their missile capabilities will further increase, both in numbers 
and quality in the next years due to new technology breakthroughs as the result of an 
increasing global proliferation network.  
                                            
155  See also Jim Mann, Los Angeles Times, 6 September 2000 (here electronic version). 
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The 1991 Persian Gulf War (”Operation Desert Storm”) has shown that those theater 
ballistic missiles (TBMs) like the Irakian Scud-missiles have still a greater psychological 
impact than destructive power. In the next years and decades, however, the power of 
destruction of those TBMs will rapidly increase. These TBMs might be particularly 
destabilizing due to their inherent elements of surprise (short launch and warning time) 
as well as of limited possibilities of an early detecting and of effective countermeasures. 
As the Rumsfeld-report and others have confirmed, former US intelligence analyses 
were based too heavily upon the US and Russian experiences which have led to 
assessments underestimating the pace of new ballistic missile programs in developing 
and threshold countries. Those states, for instance, are often content with less accurate 
and less reliable short- and intermediate-range surface-to surface missiles (SSMs). 
Unless a country threatened by those TBMs has no adequate early-warning systems for 
detection and an effective anti-ballistic missile defense to neutralize those missiles 
under greatest psychological strain it might see no other chance in a mounting crisis 
than to opt for first strikes as part of preventive or preemptive military options to destroy 
them before they are launched.  
The TMD-debate has important implications for the future of the U.S.-Japanese security 
alliance in the Asia-Pacific region and will shape the security discussions as well as 
determine the security perceptions in the first decade of the next century. But although 
China’s nuclear and missile modernization pre-dates the U.S. debate over TMD and 
NMD and is therefore not driving strategic modernization, these ballistic missile defense 
programs may create repercussions by fastening ongoing nuclear modernization 
programs in China, India and Russia.156 In this light, any policy decisions for TMD 
programs are justified against the background above for non-nuclear states facing 
increasing nuclear and missile threats. However, any decisions for a TMD-program 
must be carefully implemented because of the inherent complexities, possible 
repercussions as well as due to the political and military implications. Furthermore, 
because of the varying variables and ramifications in the specific cases of Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan, decisions regarding TMD must also be made on a case-by-case 
basis after analyzing all dimensions of the regional and global security developments.157 
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For South Korea, for instance, the missile requirements are quite different to those of 
Japan and Taiwan. It therefore even does not place high priority on expending 
resources on lower-tier TMD systems and expects that the U.S. forces on the Korean 
peninsula will deploy additional lower-tier TMD systems, whereas the U.S. Navy will 
deploy sea-based, upper-tier TMD systems in the future that have proven their 
interception capabilities.158 For Taiwan, upgraded Patriot systems (PAC-3) and Aegis-
equipped ships would provide Taiwan with a limited capability against China’s ballistic 
missiles and psychological reassurance to the Taiwanese population. But any transfer 
of TMD systems to Taiwan could also produce a wide range of negative consequences 
for the Taiwan Strait and U.S.-China relationships. In this light, the sale of lower-tier 
TMD systems is more justified, whereas any upper-tier TMD systems should be 
withheld by the U.S. and linked to the future development of the Taiwan Strait relations 
and China’s military and missile buildup vis-à-vis Taiwan.159 In this regard, TMD or 
single TMD systems of the layered defense system may be used as a bargaining chip 
vis-à-vis China, aimed to freeze and downsize China’s missile arsenal. 
For South Korea and Taiwan, the only military alternative for TMD (if one excludes a 
nuclear option) is a long-range missile buildup. That, however, might not only threaten 
its global and regional MTCR and non-proliferation policies, but perhaps also incite a 
new arms race in an already complex military-strategic environment in Northeast Asia. 
Furthermore, it would undermine crisis stability and conflict management by creating 
additional incentives for preventive or preemptive military strike options on both sides of 
the Korean peninsula or the Taiwan Strait. 
In the case of Japan, both lower and upper-tier TMD systems can be justified but also 
used as a bargaining chip to create a strategic dialogue with Beijing on regional security 
issues. Furthermore, the joint TMD development is strengthening the U.S.-Japanese 
security alliance which is — together with the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear 
deterrence in Northeast Asia — the linchpin for the overall regional security and stability 
in the entire region. In this light, the TMD program with the U.S. should be seen as a 
”window of opportunity” in the next decade and therewith a chance for a strategic 
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dialogue between Japan and China160 as well as between the U.S. and China.161 In this 
light, ultimately it will be China’s policies and behavior that will decide upon the 
deployment and implementation of a Japanese or Japanese-U.S. TMD program. 
Thereby it should not be overlooked by TMD critics that despite potential repercussions 
for the U.S.-Sino relationship as well as bilateral relations within East Asia, a TMD 
system can also dissuade countries from expanding their ballistic missile arsenal and 
thus contribute to non-proliferation and reduction of the number of missiles equipped 
with WMD — dependent on its military-technological effectivity. Without an effective 
TMD, those states expanding their ballistic missile arsenal and WMD programs will not 
face any military-political repercussions by the international community, which may 
ultimately translate into appeasement policies by the world community. The ”double 
standards” in the western policies vis-à-vis Kosovo and Chechnya are striking in many 
ways and may function as a warning indicator because the difference has often been 
justified by Western politicians that Russia has nuclear weapons. Not it should 
overlooked that TMD does not represent the prime driving force of a regional arms race 
because it is simply a response to an ongoing arms buildup: without missiles, no missile 
defense. Furthermore, most of the global non-proliferation agreements are essentially 
based on a supply-side approach which suffers from inherent defects: they do not 
include and address the motivations of those states conducting WMD and ballistic 
missile defense programs. Hence, those arms control agreements and non-proliferation 
efforts such as the MCTR may only buy time and delay and/or constrain the 
development and deployment of those WMD weaponry but not always and for all time 
prevent the spreading of particular dual-use technologies used for ballistic missile and 
WMD programs. 
In this light, Japan’s future security will also be influenced by global developments of 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs such as in Russia and 
South Asia that already complicates Tokyo’s search for a more effective arms control 
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policy.162 Against the background above, Japan should proceed with its joint research 
and development program of TMD in a highly cautious manner that has to include 
comprehensive security dialogues and discussions with China and the U.S. concerning 
TMD and ongoing ballistic missile programs. As Shinichi Ogawa, Senior Research 
Fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) in Tokyo has argued: ”The 
key to success for controlling ballistic missiles in East Asia depends on the recognition 
by regional states that strategic stability ensured by the non-deployment of ballistic 
missiles is more important and desirable than the short-lived military advantages 
brought about by ballistic missiles.”163 
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